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I. INTRODUCTION
Cross-border' mergers and acquisitions have become a standard
feature of the increasingly global world of international business and
finance. This effect is generally due to economic globalization, which
provides commercial entities the opportunity to create synergies by com-
bining operations in different countries. This effect is also a result of the
dramatic increase observed within the last fifteen years or so of cross-
border securities investment,2 which has resulted in many sizable com-
panies having broadly dispersed shareholder bases.
One result of these developments has been that participants in
merger and acquisition "M&A" transactions (including bidders, targets
and their respective advisers) are increasingly subject to the disclosure
and procedural requirements of multiple regulatory systems. The appli-
cability of competing systems of takeover regulation typically arises as a
product of the diverse regulatory philosophies among nations. Some
countries, such as the United Kingdom and France, regulate tender
offers only if the target is organized under the laws of their jurisdiction.
In a traditional two-party acquisition, this policy means that only one
country's rules apply, since the target generally is not organized under
the law of more than one jurisdiction. Other countries, such as the
United States and Canada, regulate tender offers on the basis of domes-
tic market interest, or the existence of resident target shareholders,
regardless of the target's country of organization. This philosophical
difference occasionally overlays a more striking distinction between reg-
ulatory systems: the regulating process itself. For example, many coun-
tries, including the United States, regulate takeovers according to statute,
frequently with delegated rule-making authority to an agency such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission. In contrast, other countries, nota-
bly the United Kingdom, and recently, Germany, utilize non-statutory
bodies to regulate takeovers where compliance is voluntary.
Differences between applicable regulations mean that relief from
the regulatory requirements of one or more jurisdictions may be neces-
sary to permit a bidder to conduct a single tender or exchange offer
1. As used in this Article in the context of mergers and acquisitions, the terms "cross-
border," "international," "transnational," etc., refer to mergers and acquisitions in which (i) the
bidder and target are each organized under the laws of different countries and/or (ii) the target's
shareholders are located in more than one country.
2. In the United States, the annual level of investment in the securities of non-U.S.
companies has risen from an estimated $10.4 billion in 1980, to $130.9 billion in 1990.
International Tender and Exchange Offers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-29275, 1991 SEC
LEXIS 1026, at *4 (June 5, 1991) [hereinafter SEC Tender Offer Proposal]. During 1995, U.S.
investors purchased over $395 billion in equity securities of non-U.S. entities. See Treasury
Bulletin, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Statistical Abstract No. 807 (1996).
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complying with all applicable rules and regulations.' Given adequate
time and resources, it is generally possible to obtain relief from conflict-
ing rules and regulations by approaching one or more regulatory authori-
ties.4 However, overlapping and competing regulatory schemes may
increase the burden on bidders and other transaction participants, and
may impose externalities on both the market as a whole as well as on
specific groups of shareholders.
In most developed countries, legislators and market participants
have reached the conclusion that the benefits of a tender offer regulatory
scheme, typically intended to protect target shareholders, outweigh the
attendant costs, delays and uncertainties that such regulation creates.
Tensions and incompatibilities between systems often multiply these
costs, delays, and uncertainties, or impose other detrimental effects. At
least theoretically, the detrimental cumulative effect may deter a uni-
verse of otherwise beneficial mergers which presumably would have
occurred if the law of only one jurisdiction were applicable to ensure
sufficient shareholder protections.
Economic theory aside, significant practical detriments can and do
befall specific shareholder groups where conflicting regulatory systems
govern a particular transaction. Where the target's shareholder base is
narrowly distributed, and the bidder determines that it can attain the
number of shares desired5 or required6 by focusing tender activities on
shareholders within a limited number of jurisdictions, the bidder will
often exclude shareholders outside those jurisdictions from the tender
offer. For instance, in takeovers of companies organized under the law
of the United Kingdom, bidders frequently implement procedures
intended to prevent shareholders in the United States, Canada, Japan and
3. The most obvious solution to this problem-simultaneous conduct of multiple tender
offers-is generally unavailable to a bidder because most regulatory systems require that all
shareholders be treated equally. See, e.g., SEC Rule 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1996). Not
surprisingly then, and typically in conjunction with additional requests for relief from applicable
rules, takeover participants will frequently seek the permission of regulators to conduct such
simultaneous tender offers. See, e.g., infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
5. Under the corporate governance laws of some states and certain countries outside the
United States, acquisition of a certain percentage of a target's shares may give the bidder the right
to "freeze out" the minority shareholders, making the company wholly owned by the bidder. See
infra note 11.
6. Under the laws of some countries, a tender offer must be for a minimum percentage of the
target's outstanding shares. If the bidder does not receive tenders representing at least that
number of shares, the offer must lapse. See, e.g., THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS,
in THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS AND THE RULES GOVERNING SUBSTANTIAL
AcQuisrrbONS OF SHARES (5th ed. 1996) [hereinafter CITY CODE]. The CITY CODE requires that
any bid, which would result in ownership of shares representing more than 50% of a target's
voting rights, not be declared "unconditional as to acceptances" unless the bidder has acquired or
agreed to acquire shares representing at least 50% of the voting rights. Id. at rule 10.
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Australia7 from participating. These procedures frequently force share-
holders to sell their shares into the market in order to realize a portion of
the premium that the tender offers. However, these shareholders incur
transaction costs (frequently in addition to a differential that is recouped
by the arbitrage market), that they otherwise would not incur if they
were able to tender through the mechanism open to home country share-
holders.8 Because the method of excluding shareholders is typically
intended, at least in part, to withhold distribution of tender document
offering materials from them, 9 it is ironic that those shareholders who
sell into the market, do so without the benefit of the procedural and
disclosure requirements that the home market normally provides."0
Moreover, those who choose not to sell into the market are relegated to
minority shareholder status with limited liquidity. They will normally
be eliminated in a subsequent "freeze out" or "squeeze" merger."
The problem of the excluded shareholder is especially prevalent in
the United States and affects both cash bids and stock-for-stock
exchange offers. In the cash bid context, there are two reasons for U.S.
shareholder exclusion. First is the Williams Act. 2 This is the principal
7. See SEC Tender Offer Proposal, supra note 2, at *5-6 & n. 18 (citing Plessey Co. PLC v.
General Electric Co. PLC, 628 F. Supp. 477, 490 (D. Del. 1986); see also Consolidated Gold
Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989); Hiram Walker Resources Ltd. v. Gulf
Canada, C.A. No. 86-0780 (D.D.C. March 25, 1989).
8. See SEC Tender Offer Proposal, supra note 2, at *7. Furthermore, these shareholders do
not enjoy the ability to withdraw their shares from the tender process if a higher bid is made by a
new bidder or the original bid is increased.
9. For instance, under the terms of the 1987 bid for the shares of B.A.T. Enterprises PLC by
Hoylake Investments Ltd., offering documents were not sent into the United States, the offer could
not be accepted by anyone in the United States, and the cash and securities used as consideration
in the offer were not sent into the United States. See Brown and MacLachlan, infra note I 11, at
193-95.
10. See Concept Release on Multinational Tender and Exchange Offers, SEC Release Nos.
33-6866, 34-28093, 1990 SEC LEXIS 1139 at *2-3 (June 6, 1990) [hereinafter SEC Concept
Release].
11. Many jurisdictions have corporate or company law provisions that permit such mergers.
For instance, Delaware's General Corporation Law permits "short-form" mergers where 90% or
more of the target's shares are held. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1996). The English Rules
provide that if an acquirer acquires at least 90% of the class of shares bid for within four months,
they may acquire the balance compulsorily. See Companies Act 1985, ch. 6, 428-430F (Eng.).
Therefore, it is unusual for a party making an offer for a U.K. listed company to fail to acquire
100% of the target shares.
Most jurisdictions have rules which require the freeze price to be the same as the original
tender offer price. There is no premium for the time cost of funds during the interval. This
provides little incentive for shareholders to wait for a freeze out. As a result, most of the
shareholders who are unable to sell through the formal tender mechanism will sell into the
arbitrage market well before a freeze out.
12. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(e)-(c),
78n(d)-(f)(1994)).
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federal statute governing tender offers in the United States. 13 Together
with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") thereunder,' 4 the Williams Act regime
has resulted in procedural and disclosure requirements that are generally
more onerous than those in other developed countries. Furthermore,
although the SEC is, by its own standards, quick to respond to waiver
requests from certain tender offer rules, it is often much slower than
regulators in other countries. For instance, the United Kingdom's Take-
over Panel frequently responds to requests for interpretive guidance and
waivers within 24 hours.
The second reason for U.S. shareholder exclusion or "freeze out" is
the perception that the risk of securities fraud liability is substantially
higher in the United States than in other countries. The U.S. anti-fraud
rules, both within and without the tender offer context, have been inter-
preted as having broad extraterritorial application.' 5 The lure of avoid-
ing the U.S. anti-fraud rules may create a powerful incentive to exclude
U.S. shareholders from a tender offer in situations in which a takeover
bidder and its advisors would not otherwise face the possibility of U.S.
liability.
The exchange offer context implicates these same concerns. Addi-
tionally, however, preparing a registration statement complying with the
SEC's rigorous requirements adds inherent costs and delays. The SEC
will generally not permit home-country disclosure to substitute for SEC-
required disclosure when the home-country disclosure does not meet
SEC form requirements. The result is that bidders in cross-border
exchange offers are highly motivated to exclude U.S. shareholders. Spe-
cial liability provisions relating to the registration statement and related
prospectus result in strict liability for the party issuing the offered securi-
ties, reinforcing the already justifiable reluctance to include U.S.
shareholders.
Part II of this Article will analyze a hypothetical cross-border take-
over bid in order to explore the philosophical and practical differences
between the United States and certain European systems of tender offer
13. Although a detailed discussion of non-federal law is beyond the scope of this Article, it
should be noted that most states have laws that may impact the conduct of tender offers. See
generally, Edward F. Greene, Regulatory and Legislative Responses to Takeover Activity in the
1980s: The United States and Europe, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1539, 1556-72 (1991) (describing the
development of state anti-takeover laws between 1968 and 1990). For a discussion of state law
may impact certain defensive strategies in the context of hostile takeover bids, see infra notes 204-
08 and accompanying text.
14. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-I to 240.14e-7 (1996).
15. See, e.g., Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, 871 F. 2d 252, 255, 262 (2d Cir.
1989) (extra-territorial application of anti-fraud provisions is appropriate where actions will have
a substantial effect in United States).
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regulation, primarily the United Kingdom and France. The Article will
also describe various accommodations that regulators make in some of
these jurisdictions when a target's widely dispersed shareholder base
makes it necessary for them to conduct the bid in more than one jurisdic-
tion to attain their desired 16 or required 7 tender levels. Part II concludes
that, in general, those accommodations indicate a positive and flexible
attitude toward the problems presented by cross-border takeovers
(assuming certain minimal protections are maintained for shareholders).
However, a consistent and cohesive approach to cross-border takeovers
continues to be absent, with the result that the externalities discussed
above' 8 will continue.
Part III will review a number of proposals that have been made
since 1990 for (i) improving the U.S. approach to international takeover
activity, including the SEC's 1991 Tender Offer Proposal,' 9 and (ii)
developing an intersystem approach (i.e., a systemic approach for regu-
lators of a number of countries) to resolve the tensions that such activity
has created, including the Commission of the European Communities
proposed Directive 13.20 Part III concludes that rapid changes in the
global capital markets, recent amendment to the U.S. federal securities
laws, on-going debate over Directive 13, and recent changes in local
takeover rules and regulations within a number of European countries,
make this a propitious time to explore ways in which both the SEC and
the international regulatory community could work together to resolve
tensions that conflicting takeover regulations present.
Part IV of this Article presents two proposals. First, it proposes
that the SEC take action to minimize tension between the U.S. and for-
eign takeover rules, and to provide greater certainty as to foreign bidder
liability risk, within certain classes of cross-border takeovers. It is the
authors' contention that these steps would reduce the strong incentive
these groups currently have to exclude U.S. persons from tender offers.
While acknowledging the difficulty of reaching multilateral accord
on regulatory issues, this Article's second proposal is for an interna-
tional regulatory response to the difficulty posed by cross-border acqui-
sitions. The authors hope that this proposal can be the starting point for
16. See supra note 5.
17. See supra note 6.
18. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 235. The Tender Offer Proposal has been neither adopted nor publicly
revisited by the SEC since its publication.
20. See Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a 13th European Parliament
and Council Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover Bids, EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 95)
655 (Feb. 2, 1996) [hereinafter Directive]. See also infra notes 209-29 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 51:823
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meaningful international accord on takeover regulation with the devel-
opment of a set of consistent and reliable international guidelines.
Where practicable, these proposals will be based on the authors'
further conclusions. The first is that a voluntary, self-regulatory system,
such as the one existing in the United Kingdom, which relies on market
participant involvement and the threat of non-legal sanctions by the
financial community for enforcement purposes, is preferable to a statu-
tory system based on legal enforcement of conduct. The second is that,
certainly in the case of cash-only tender offers, takeover regulations
should be based on the prevailing rules of the target company's country
of organization. The Article will also discuss the more difficult related
problem of how to deal with cross-border exchange offers (i.e., where
the bidder offers shares (or a combination of shares and cash) in
exchange for target's securities).
II. REGULATORY CONFLICT IN ACTION
A. The Hypothetical Bid
Bidder, S.A., is a socidt6 anonyme organized under the law of
France. It determines that it could realize a number of important syner-
gies by acquiring Target P.L.C., a public limited company ("PLC")
organized under the laws of England and Wales. Bidder has a few
shareholders in United States, but it is not a reporting company under
the Exchange Act, nor has it claimed the exemption from registration
available to certain foreign issuers.2"
Bidder believes that Target's established distribution channels in
the United States, where approximately eleven percent of Target's
shareholders reside, and where American Depositary Shares ("ADSs")
representing Target's shares are quoted on NASDAQ, could provide
Bidder with an excellent entr6e to the U.S. market. Bidder has also eyed
Target's operations in France, where an additional seven percent of Tar-
get's shareholders reside, with a view that merging the two companies
could result in a far better sales-to-operating-expenses ratio.
Bidder decides to undertake an exchange offer for the ordinary
shares of Target. It will pay two shares of its own stock and £5 cash (or
an equivalent dollar amount for ADSs) for each share of Target. As
required under its constituent documents, Bidder obtains the approval of
its shareholders to undertake the bid.
1. WHOSE LAWS APPLY?
Bidder faces the prospect of having to comply with regulatory
21. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (1996).
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schemes in the United Kingdom, the United States, and France. Because
of the philosophy of their regulations and the rules adopted therein, each
will assert a legitimate right to regulate the bid. A brief overview of
these regulatory schemes, as well as that of Germany, is provided below.
The French and the German systems are undergoing, or have recently
undergone, significant change.
a. United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the City Code applies to offers for all listed
and unlisted public companies 22 resident in the United Kingdom, the
Channel Islands or the Isle of Man as determined by the Takeover
Panel. 23 "[I]t is the nature of the company which is the offeree or poten-
tial offeree company, or in which control ... may change or be consoli-
dated, that is relevant. '24 Since Target is organized under the laws of
the England and Wales, the Takeover Panel will consider the bid to be
governed by the City Code.
The Takeover Panel was formed in 1968 on the suggestion of the
Governor of the Bank of England and the Chairman of the London Stock
Exchange25 in response to "mounting concern about unfair practices" 26
in connection with takeover bids. Although the Takeover Panel oper-
ated for a time in conjunction with the Council for the Securities Indus-
try,27 it is now solely responsible for administering the Code. A
financial levy on certain U.K. securities transactions and offering docu-
ments sponsors the Panel's activities.28
The City Code contains a set of ten general principles,29 which are
22. The City Code also applies to certain statutory and chartered companies. See CrrY CODE,
supra note 6, at Introduction 4(a).
23. The City Code is issued and administered by the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, a non-
statutory body most of whose members are appointed by various participants-some themselves
regulatory bodies, others not-in the financial community, including the British Bankers
Association, The London Stock Exchange Limited and the Securities and Futures Authority. See
id. at Introduction 2(a). The Chairman, Deputy Chairman and certain other members are
appointed by the Governor of the Bank of England. See id.
24. Id. § 4(a). Introduction 4(a), p. A8.
25. Then known as the International Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom and Republic of
Ireland Limited. The name was changed in December 1995.
26. See THE TAKEOVER PANEL, REPORT ON THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 1996, 6 (July 18,
1996).
27. From 1976 to 1986. See Tony Shea, Regulation of Takeovers in the United Kingdom, 16
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 89, 90 n.7 (1990).
28. See id. at 91.
29. The ten General Principles of the City Code require that (1) all shareholders of the same
class be treated similarly; (2) during an offer, the offeror, offeree and their advisers provide all
shareholders with the same information; (3) an announcement should only be made when the
offeror is sure it can implement the offer; (4) shareholders should be given, and allowed, sufficient
time to consider all relevant information; (5) any document or advertisement for shareholders be
[Vol. 51:823
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applied by the Takeover Panel "in accordance with their spirit,' 30 and a
set of more detailed rules which provide guidance in specific instances.
Because the Code's general principles are expressed in broad terms, and
because the rules are "not framed in technical language," it is the spirit
of the Code and not merely the letter that must be observed.3' As a
result, takeover participants in doubt of the Code's operation are
encouraged to approach the Takeover Panel for interpretation of its rules
and principles. The Takeover Panel encourages transaction participants
to avail themselves of its guidance by allowing for prompt telephone
advice.32 In cases of difficult interpretive questions or modification or
waiver requests, 3 3 a decision can usually be obtained within 24 hours as
the Panel's Executive meets each morning. 34
This approach produces fast, efficient and flexible administration of
the Code. Although the Panel occasionally has been slow to make rule-
changes responding to perceived system abuses,35 requiring participants
to adhere to the spirit rather than the letter of the Code means that those
seeking to take advantage of "loopholes" existing on the face of the rules
may run afoul of the Code if they do not confirm their view of the rules'
operation with the Takeover Panel.
As previously noted, the City Code is a not a statutory system
enacted by the legislature. Therefore, unlike the Williams Act in the
prepared with great care and accuracy; (6) all parties to an offer act to prevent the creation of a
false market in the securities of any party to that offer; (7) if a bona fide offer has been made or is
imminent, no action should be taken to frustrate that offer without approval of the shareholders;
(8) rights of control be exercised in good faith; (9) directors only have regard to shareholder,
employee and creditor interests when giving advice to shareholders; and (10) where control of a
company is acquired by persons acting in concert or consolidating their interest, the persons
involved be normally required to make a general offer to the other shareholders. See CITY CODE,
supra note 6, at B2.
30. Id. at Introduction A3 § 3(a).
31. See id.
32. See Shea, supra note 27, at 91-92.
33. The Takeover Panel "may modify or relax the application of a Rule if it considers that, in
the particular circumstances of the case, it would operate unduly harshly or in an unnecessarily
restrictive or burdensome, or otherwise inappropriate, manner." City Code, supra note 6 at A3
§ 3(a).
34. The Executive is a department of the Takeover Panel charged with advising takeover
participants on the City Code. Decisions of the Executive can be appealed to the full Takeover
Panel which "can be convened at short notice." See William Staple, The Takeover Panel, in A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, 1, 8-9 (1996)
[hereinafter A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE].
35. See Deborah A. DeMott, Current Issues in Tender Offer Regulation: Lessons from the
British, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 945, 956 (1983). Professor DeMott notes that "the Panel has usually
prohibited an abusive practice only after it has become a problem," but acknowledges that the
Code's rules "can be tailored to respond to specific abuses," reducing the risk of "regulatory
overkill." Id. at n.50. See also D.D. Prentice, Take-Over Bids and the System of Self Regulation,
I OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 406, 412 (1981).
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United States, the City Code does not have the force of law.36 However,
the Code is acknowledged by various U.K. self-regulatory bodies as
playing a central role in the regulation of takeovers. 37 For instance, vari-
ous securities professionals, including investment banks and lawyers, are
required by the self-regulatory bodies which govern them to observe the
Takeover Code. Furthermore, a court may view the Code's prescribed
conduct as determinative of what a jury may consider reasonable behav-
ior3 8 and accordingly interpret the Code's requirements as a matter of
law.39 As a consequence of its non-statutory position, the "[t]he Code
has not, and does not seek to have, the force of law."4 However, the
disciplinary actions that the Panel can take in respect of violations of the
Code's requirements4' are treated with great seriousness by the United
Kingdom financial community. The most significant of these is a Panel
recommendation withholding the violator's ability to use the facilities of
the securities markets. 2 When a practitioner (e.g., a lawyer, accountant
or financial adviser) is publicly censured for rule violations, his or her
professional standing is "severely diminished. 43
Unlike the United States' securities laws and regulations, which, as
discussed below, contain special provisions regarding information
requirements for exchange offer prospectuses, the City Code does not
contain special exchange offer provisions." However, a prospectus pre-
pared in connection with an exchange offer in the United Kingdom must
comply with the requirements of the Financial Services Act ("FSA"), the
Public Offers of Unlisted Securities Regulations 1995 ("POS Regula-
tions"),45 and, under some circumstances, the London Stock Exchange
36. Cf. Andrew Peck, Documents from the Offeror and Offeree Board, in A PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE, supra note 34, at 127, 128 (noting that the "Code has become a document drafted in
increasingly legal terms").
37. "[Bioth government and other regulatory authorities [acknowledge] that those who seek
to take advantage of the facilities of the securities markets in the United Kingdom should conduct
themselves in matters relating to takeovers in accordance with best business standards and so
according to the Code." Crrv CODE, supra note 6, at AI-2 § 1(c).
38. See Morgan Crucible Co. PLC. v. Hill Samuel Bank Ltd., 3 All. E.R. 330, 335-36
(1990).
39. See Regina v. Lord Spens, 4 All. E.R. 421 (1991).
40. Crry CODE, supra note 6, at Al § l(c).
41. The Takeover Panel's disciplinary actions can include (i) private reprimand, (ii) public
censure, (iii) informing other regulatory authorities and (iv) taking action for the purposes of the
requirements of the Securities Investment Board ("SIB"), the principal U.K. securities regulatory
body. See id. at A5 § 3(d).
42. In most cases, this will result in any relevant self-regulatory group requiring that member
firms not deal with the violator in connection with takeovers. See Shea, supra note 27, at 95.
43. See Staple, supra note 34, at 11.
44. Cf CITY CODE, supra note 6 at Jll, rule 24.10 (offer document must contain an
independent estimation of the value of any unlisted securities offered by a bidder).
45. See, e.g., POS Regulations Rule 8.
[Vol. 51:823
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Listing Rules (the "Yellow Book").4 6
b. United States
Tender offers in the United States are regulated by the provisions of
the Williams Act,4 7 which was passed in 1968 by the U.S. Congress in
order to protect investors in takeover bids.48 The Williams Act amended
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,49 providing the SEC with various
rulemaking capabilities50 in connection with its administration of the
law.
Unlike the City Code, which, as previously discussed, regulates any
takeover bid for a company organized under the laws of England and
Wales, the Williams Act purports to regulate any tender offer made
either "directly or indirectly, by use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national
securities exchange or otherwise."'" Because of the broad sweep of the
"jurisdictional means" test, the Williams Act effectively reaches any
tender offer for a security made to a person in the United States.
The level of regulation under U.S. law depends predominantly
upon whether the tender offer involves equity securities registered under
section 12 of the Exchange Act, 52 and whether the consideration offered
is in the form, in whole or in part, of securities (other than securities
exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act). Sec-
tion 14(e) of the Exchange Act,53 and its related rules under Regulation
14E, apply to all tender offers, and create certain procedural require-
ments predominantly relating to timing of the offer. Section 14(d) of the
Exchange Act, and its related rules under Regulation 14D, require cer-
tain disclosure in connection with offers for Section 12 registered
46. See London Stock Exchange, The Listing Rules, ch. 5 (1996).
47. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e),
78n(d)-(f) (1994).
48. The legislation was intended to reduce "undue pressure on shareholders to act hastily and
to accept an offer, before management or any other group has an opportunity to present opposing
argument or competing offers." See Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Securities on S. 510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at 21 (1967).
49. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (codified as amended, at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj,
(1994)).
50. See, e.g., id. § 78n(d)(1) (tender offers to contain such information as the SEC "may by
rules and regulations prescribe").
51. Id.
52. Section 12 of the Exchange Act requires that any class of equity securities listed on a
national exchange-as well equity securities of companies with requisite asset and shareholder
levels-be registered with the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d). The SEC exempts certain
foreign issuers from the requirements of this section. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (1996).
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(e).
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securities. 54
The question of whether a non-U.S. bidder's efforts to gain control
of a company is subject to the Williams Act can be further complicated
by the fact that the term "tender offer" is not defined in the Williams Act
or the rules promulgated thereunder. 5  The uncertainty regarding the
extraterritorial scope of the U.S. securities laws generally, especially
where steps are taken by the bidder to avoid the U.S. jurisdictional
means, complicates this determination even further.56 The SEC has
developed an eight factor analysis for determining whether or not a
tender offer has been made 57 but- the U.S. courts have given this
approach a mixed reception.5 8
For purposes of this Article's hypothetical bid, assuming that Bid-
der wishes to include U.S. shareholders in its takeover bid, the offer of
cash and shares for Target shares held by U.S. shareholders will be con-
sidered a tender and exchange offer under U.S. law. Thus, Bidder will
be subject to the requirements of the Williams Act and the rules promul-
gated thereunder, which will govern the tender offer, as well as the
requirements of the Securities Act, which will govern certain aspects of
the exchange offer, particularly the obligation to deliver a prospectus to
each Target shareholder that complies with the disclosure and timing
requirements of the Securities Act.5 9
As noted, the SEC is charged with administering the Williams Act.
As with other areas of the U.S. securities laws, the SEC has the power to
provide parties, including Bidder, with exemptions from various Wil-
liams Act requirements. The SEC typically grants such relief in the
form of "no-action" letters, in which it agrees that it will not recommend
SEC enforcement of what would otherwise constitute violations of
applicable regulation. However, obtaining exemptive relief from the
SEC can be a time-consuming process. A fair degree of behind-the-
scenes negotiation with the SEC staff can be required before agreement
is reached. As discussed in greater detail below, the SEC has, in a
54. See id. Section 14(d) and its related rules only apply to tender offers which, if
consummated, would result in the bidder holding 5% or more of the class of securities sought.
55. See 1 EDWARD F. GREENE E7 AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
AND DERIVATIVES MARKET § 7.03(1), at 7-8 (3d ed. 1996). In 1979, the SEC proposed a
definition of "tender offer" which has never been adopted. See Proposed Amendments to Tender
Offer Rules, Securities Act Release No. 6159, 1979 SEC LEXIS 218, at *9-17 (Nov. 29, 1979).
56. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Imprudent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of Foreign
Tender Offers, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 523 (1993).
57. See GREENE, supra note 55, at 7-8.
58. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (mandatory
application of eight-factor test unnecessary where target shareholders were sophisticated investors
not in need of protections of Williams Act).
59. See infra notes 170-86 and accompanying text.
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number of cross-border acquisitions, granted relief enabling non-U.S.
bidders to proceed with takeover bids in the United States without strict
compliance with the United States' usual procedural and disclosure
requirements.
Failure to comply with the requirements of the Williams Act can
result in the SEC bringing an enforcement action in the form of an
administrative proceeding, or in a private action by the target or its
shareholders.60 Violation of the Williams Act, including its insider trad-
ing provisions, can also result in criminal liability.
c. Two other examples
France regulates the conduct of tender offers through the Commis-
sion des Operations de Bourse (the "COB") and the Conseil des
March6s Financiers (the "CMF"), both of which are statutorily created.
The French rules apply to offers for those companies organized under
French law and listed on the official market, the second market, or the
over-the-counter market of the French stock exchange. Thus, although
7% of Target's shareholders are in France, the French rules do not apply
because Target is organized under the laws of England and Wales.
French law subjects takeovers to extensive regulation. In addition
to a number of procedural requirements, which, as discussed more fully
below, are broadly similar to those found in the United States and the
United Kingdom, France subjects the actual terms of takeover bids,
including the price offered for the securities, to regulatory scrutiny.
The new, and still nascent, German Takeover Code6' also bears
mention as it represents something of a hybrid between the U.S. and
U.K. approach to regulation. The German code follows the United
Kingdom's voluntary, self-regulatory model.62 This approach "enable[s]
a faster and more efficient reaction to changes ...[in] the legal and
economic environment than ... would be possible in the case of statu-
tory regulation."63 The German Takeover Commission, like the U.K.'s
Takeover Panel, is comprised of appointed members from the financial
community, 6' including credit institutions, academia, investment serv-
60. The Williams Act does not contain an express right of action for private litigants.
However the U.S. courts have found an implied private right of action in the statute for target
companies and their shareholders. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 993 (3d Cir.
1988).
61. See ubernahmekodex BJrsensachverstdndigenkommission [Takeover Code of the
Exchange Expert Commission at the Federal Ministry of Finance] July 14, 1995, translated in The
New German Takeover Code, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, Annex 1 (1996) [hereinafter,
CGSH German Memo].
62. See id. at 7.
63. CGSH German Memo id. at 10.
64. Members are appointed by the German Exchange Expert Commission
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ices and others participants in the capital markets. The Takeover Com-
mission can amend the German Takeover Code whenever necessary.
The German Takeover Code does not automatically apply to all
takeovers. Rather, a party must provide an affirmative "accession decla-
ration" to the German Takeover Commission-what essentially amounts
to a declaration that the relevant party will comply with the German
Takeover Code. The legal significance of this declaration, enforceabil-
ity of the German Code's requirements against the declarer as a matter
of contract law or otherwise, remains unclear. 65 However, when a bid-
der undertakes voluntary accession to the Takeover Code, it is expected
to make the Takeover Code part of the offer and share purchase agree-
ment. In theory, this gives shareholders a contractual remedy against the
bidder if the Code is breached. As of this writing, the German Takeover
Code has been complied with in a number of tender offers but, in others,
the Code was not adhered to. 6 6
B. Regulatory Tension
This Part will discuss certain tensions that may arise between the
United States and United Kingdom regulatory systems in connection
with Bidder's tender offer for Target. As in the preceding Part, differ-
ences among other developed countries' rules will also be noted. The
principal differences between the rules arise in the following areas: (1)
ownership reporting and mandatory offers, (2) commencement of the
offering, (3) minimum offer periods, (4) withdrawal rights, (5) purchases
outside the bid, (6) defensive tactics, and (7) disclosure obligations.
1. OWNERSHIP REPORTING
Ownership reporting is a subject closely related to tender offer reg-
ulation, since most tender offerors start with at least some stake in the
target company. Ownership reporting requirements are generally imple-
mented to prevent people from acquiring secretly a controlling stake in
an issuer's securities or from doing so without giving all shareholders
the opportunity to sell.
To illustrate some of the differing treatments of ownership report-
ing rules, suppose that prior to commencing a tender offer, Bidder holds
29% of Target's shares. Based on its belief that an increased stake in
Target will provide it with greater influence in Target's affairs, Bidder
(Bersensachverstgandigenkommission), also known as, and referred to herein as, the BSK. See id.
at 2. The BSK is, in turn, appointed by the German Ministry of Finance. See id.
65. See id. CGSH German Memo at 15 (difficulty lies in the fact that the BSK is not a legal
entity).
66. See id. at 20-22.
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makes several market purchases over a two-day period in both London
and New York, increasing its ownership of Target from 29% to 30.5%.
As a result, Bidder will be required to (1) under both U.S. and U.K.
rules, report the purchase to the issuer and relevant regulators, and (2)
under the U.K. rules, undertake a "mandatory" bid in cash or with a full
cash alternative for all of Target's outstanding shares.6"
In the United States, Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act requires
any person who, through an acquisition,68 becomes "directly or indi-
rectly the beneficial owner" of 5% or more of any class of voting equity
securities registered pursuant to section 12 of the Exchange Act to send
a statement of beneficial ownership to the issuer of such securities, any
exchange on which the securities are listed and the SEC.69 This require-
ment applies whether or not the issuer of the securities is a U.S. com-
pany. Movements of more than 1% in ownership require the holder to
amend its filing promptly. Accordingly, assuming Bidder had previ-
ously complied with its filing obligations in respect of its ownership of
29% of Target's shares, the purchase of an additional 1.5% of the shares
would require an amended filing.
In addition, under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 197670 (the "HSR Act") and related rules, parties to certain trans-
actions (generally ones involving acquisitions of more than 15% of a
company of significant size) must file reports with the U.S. Fair Trade
Commission and the Department of Justice, and observe a waiting
period before consummation of such transactions. Accordingly, where
an issuer does not have securities registered under Section 12 of the
Exchange Act (i.e., where Section 13(d)'s ownership reporting require-
ment does not apply), the first reporting obligation is that required by the
HSR Act's, at 15%. 7 Non-compliance with the HSR Act can result in
civil penalties.
In the United Kingdom, the Rules Governing Substantial Acquisi-
tion of Shares ("SARs") create ownership reporting requirements.72 The
67. CITY CODE, supra note 6, at F13, rule 9.5(a).
68. So-called "passive acquisitions" of such shares are exempted from the filing requirement
as in cases where a holder's percentage of an issuer's outstanding equity increases as a result of
the issuer's repurchasing of shares. Curiously, however, members of the SEC's staff have
indicated informally that ownership of debentures convertible into a dollar value of shares can
trigger a filing obligation if, as a result of a fall in share price, that dollar value would purchase
over 5% of the class.
69. Such a statement is generally made on either Schedule 13D or Schedule 13G under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1996).
70. Pub. L. No. 94-435, tit. II, § 201, 90 Stat. 1390 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(Supp. 1994)).
71. See §§ 18a(a)(2), 18a(a)(3).
72. See CITY CODE, supra note 6, at 5-16 contains Substantial Acquisition Rules which are
issued and administered by the London Takeover Panel [hereinafter SARs].
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SARs are designed to prevent so-called "dawn raids," characterized as
substantial acquisitions of shares through market purchases or otherwise
in a relatively brief period of time without the knowledge of the issuer.
The SARs require any person whose ownership of an issuer's securities
goes over a 15% threshold to notify the company and the London Stock
Exchange of this fact by the next business day.73 Independent of the
SARs, under Sections 198 through 210 of the Companies Act 1985,
movement in either direction across a 3% ownership threshold requires
notice to the company within two days of dealing,74 and to the London
Stock Exchange ("LSE") "without delay." Subsequent whole percent-
age point movements in either direction above 3% require similar notice.
In addition, under both French and United Kingdom corporation laws, a
company can set almost any threshold percentage at which reporting of
interests is required.75
Moreover, by virtue of passing the 30% ownership mark, Rule
9.1(a) of the City Code requires that Bidder undertake a bid for all of the
outstanding equity shares of Target's stock.76 In fact, under Rule 5.1 (a)
of the City Code, Bidder would have been prohibited, subject to certain
exceptions, from crossing the 30% threshold unless a public offer was
about to be undertaken. Furthermore, where a person holds over 30%,
Rule 5.1 (b) prevents that person from acquiring more than an additional
1% without undertaking a public offer.77
Mandatory bids are somewhat rare78 as the special requirements
and limitations that apply to mandatory bids under the City Code result
in special care being taken not to cross the relevant thresholds. For
instance, a mandatory bid must be for cash, or include a cash alternative,
at a price at least as high as the maximum price paid by the bidder
during the previous twelve months. 79  Furthermore, under City Code
73. See id. at 9, rule 3. Rule I restricts the rate at which shares may be acquired. See id. at 5,
rule 1.
74. Note that sections 198 through 210 of Companies Act 1985 and SARs both require
"dealings." It appears that passive changes in ownership (resulting from reacquisitions or
issuances by the company) do not trigger the requirement.
75. See, e.g., CODE DES SocIarEs [French Companies Law] art. 356-1 (company can set a
reporting threshold as low as 0.5%); Companies Act 1985 § 212.
76. See also CITY CODE, supra note 6, at B2, principle 10 ("[w]here control ... is acquired
a general offer to all other shareholders is normally required"). Id.
77. See id. at E4, rule 5.1(a), (b). Under section 430A of the Companies Act 1985, a person
who acquires 90% or more of the company's shares or of any class through a takeover offer must
notify previously non-assenting shareholders of this fact. Under section 429, non-assenting
shareholders then have right to be bought out at the tender offer price.
78. In the year ended March 31, 1995 only 12 out of the 108 bids made for U.K. companies
were mandatory bids under Rule 9. Christopher Pearson, Mandatory and Voluntary Offers and
Their Terms, in A PRACTrTIONER'S GUIDE, supra note 34, at 90-91.
79. See CITY CODE, supra note 6, at F13, rule 9.5. However, exceptions to the "highest price"
rule can be made by the Panel where appropriate. See id. at F14. Exceptions to the general rule
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Rule 9.3, a mandatory bid must be conditional upon 50.1% of the out-
standing shares being tendered. The bidder cannot condition the bid on,
say, 90% acceptance. Most importantly, unlike a voluntary bid, a
mandatory bid cannot contain conditions other than the acceptance con-
dition except in relation to the U.K. Monopolies and Mergers Commis-
sion and the European Commission. As a result, conditions that are
common in both the United States and the United Kingdom, such as bids
conditioned on a lack of adverse change in the target or bidder's busi-
ness, or the approval of a bidder's shareholders, are not permissible in a
mandatory bid under the City Code.
In France, ownership of exchange listed securities must be reported
to the CMF and the issuer when the holder's voting rights reach the 5%,
10%, 20%, 33.33%, 50%, and 66.66% levels.80 In addition, a person
holding more than one-third (33.3%) of the shares or voting rights in a
French company listed on the official or second market of the bourse
(exchange), must make a bid for all of the company's shares. 8' Interest-
ingly, what most would regard as "passive" acquisitions of control can
trigger the mandatory offer requirement. Notably, under the charters of
some French companies, shares held by the same party for a specified
period (typically two years), without any subsequent acquisitions by
such party, become entitled to double voting rights.82 The acquisition of
double voting rights resulting in the owner having more than one-third
of the company's voting rights can trigger the mandatory offer require-
ment. Under French law, a mandatory offer cannot be conditioned on a
minimum number of shares being tendered. The bidder must accept all
shares tendered regardless of the number.
Under the Germany Takeover Code, a mandatory offer is triggered
if more than 50% of the voting rights are held.83
2. COMMENCEMENT OF THE OFFER
In the United States, Rule 14d-2(b) of the Exchange Act requires a
bidder for shares registered under the Exchange Act to commence its
offer within five days of a public announcement that includes the price
or a range of prices to be offered and the number of securities sought.84
may be appropriate where, e.g., the takeover bid is undertaken as part of a rescue plan for a
troubled company whose share price has slid since the bidder's initial purchases. See Pearson,
supra note 78 at 85-86.
80. See French Companies Law art. 356-1 in CODE DES SocIErES, supra bite 74, at 402.
81. See French General Regulation, art. 5-4-1 in THIERRY SCHOEN, THE FRENCH STOCK
EXCHANGE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR INVESTORS AND ADVISORS (1995).
82. See SCHOEN, supra note 81, at 95.
83. See CGSH German Memo, supra note 60 at 18.
84. An announcement that a bidder intends to make a tender offer in the future but which does
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On the day of commencement, the bidder must also file with the SEC
and provide the target with certain information regarding its bid.85
In the United Kingdom, a potential bidder may be required to make
a brief public announcement 86 regarding its intention to make an offer.
The announcement can be triggered in a number of ways, but typically it
arises as a result of (i) the bidder communicating its "firm intention to
make an offer" to the target's board of directors or (ii) either prior or
subsequent to communication with the target's board, the target becom-
ing the "subject of rumor and speculation or there ... [being] untoward
movement 87 in [the target's] share price. ' 88 After public announcement,
the bidder must mail its offering document to the target and its share-
holders within twenty-eight days. 89
Bidder's first potential regulatory conflict will arise if it triggers the
City Code's public announcement requirement. Depending on its con-
tent, the brief announcement could be construed as triggering Rule 14d-
2(b) under the Exchange Act. This would require Bidder to prepare and
distribute its U.S. Schedule 14D-1 within five days, rather than having
the City Code's 28 days in which to prepare a formal offer document.
This difficulty arose in the context of the 1994 offer by Browning-Ferris
not indicate the number of securities sought or the consideration to be paid does create such a
requirement. See 17 C.F.R. § 240-14d-2(d) (1996).
85. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-2-240.14d-3 (1996). The filing must comply with the
requirements of Schedule 14D-1 which calls for the following information to be provided: The
identity of the target company and securities, the identity of the bidder, the source and amount of
funds, the purpose of the offer, the amount of target shares held by the bidder and a description of
any transactions by the bidder in the target's shares over the preceding 60 days, and financial
information regarding the bidder. The practice of market participants is to include financial
information regarding the bidder in cash offers. The Schedule 14D-1 typically also includes
information on the offer procedures (e.g., timing, withdrawal rights, extensions, etc.).
86. Rule 2.5 of the City Code sets out the information that must be included in the
announcement. This information, which is significantly less detailed than that required by
Schedule 14D-1 (see supra note 83) includes the terms of the offer, the identity of the bidder,
details of existing or anticipated shareholdings by the bidder and a description of relevant
conditions. See CrrY CODE, supra note 6, at D5-6, rule 2.5.
87. An "untoward movement" is regarded as one of approximately 10%. See City Code,
supra note 6, at D4, Note on Rule 2.2.
88. Id. at D3, Rule 2.2. In addition, a bidder must make an announcement (a) upon
acquisition of shares giving rise to a mandatory offer under Rule 9, (b) when information about
the proposed bid is to be extended to "include more than a very restricted number of people (e.g.,
where a consortium is being put together or where irrevocable commitments are being sought),
and (c) when a purchaser is sought for a holding, or aggregate holdings, of shares carrying more
than 30% of the voting rights of a company, or when such company's board of directors is seeking
potential bidders, and (i) rumor, speculation or untoward movement in share price occurs, or (ii)
the number of potential purchasers or bidders is about to be increased "to include more than a very
restricted number of people." Id.
89. See id. at M1, rule 30.1.
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Industries, Inc. and BFI Acquisitions PLC for Attwoods PLC.9° There
the SEC confirmed that the bidder could distribute its Schedule 14D- I in
accordance with City Code practice (i.e., 28 days after the brief
announcement required by the Code).
Commencement of the offer under the U.S. and U.K. rules should
be contrasted with the French rules. In France, the offer process begins
with the bidder's bank's filing a description of the proposed offer with
the CMF 9' and a draft prospectus with the COB.92 This information is
similar to the City Code's "brief announcement" requirement, although
the timing is quite different. Under French rules, the bidder must have
already applied for all requisite approvals from relevant regulatory bod-
ies (e.g., antitrust authorities) prior to filing. The applications them-
selves would be a practical impossibility if the City Code's
announcement obligation had not been met.9 3
When the CMF receives the bidder's filing, it will suspend trading
of the target for a five-day period while it considers whether the offer is
acceptable.94 The Socigte des Bourses Fran~aises ("SBF") announces
the filing.95 In yet another contrast to both the U.S. and U.K. practice,
the bidder must justify the price it proposes offering shareholders, and
the CMF may ask the bidder to reconsider the proposed price if it con-
siders it unacceptable.96 Once the target's prospectus or the joint pro-
spectus of the target and the bidder, as the case may be, is approved by
the COB, the SBF publishes a tender offer "opening notice," that for-
mally commences the opening of the offer.97
3. OFFER PERIODS AND EXTENSIONS
Most countries' laws require that a tender offer remain open for a
90. See Browning Ferris Industries, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
697, at *24-25 (Sept. 19, 1994).
91. The banks must act as guarantors of the bidder's undertaking; if the bidder is unable to
purchase the shares tendered by holders in connection with the offering, the banks must make the
purchase. See SCHOEN, supra note 81, at 85.
92. See id. at 86. Both the bidder and its banks must sign the prospectus, guaranteeing that
the information contained in the prospectus is complete and not misleading. See id.
93. See CITY CODE supra note 6, at D3, rule 2.2(e) (requiring announcement where
discussions are about to be extended to include more than a "very restricted number of people," or
when approach to offeree company results in the offeree company becoming the subject of rumor
and speculation).
94. See SCHOEN, supra note 81, at 85-86. The French regulators have "broad discretion in this
regard." Id. at 86. Trading in the target's shares generally resumes two trading days after the SBF
publishes the avis de recevabilite, announcing the CMF approval of the offer. See CMF
REGULATIONS.
95. The SBF assists in preparation and implementation of CMF decisions. See CMF
REGULATIONS, supra note 94, at art. 5-2-8.
96. See id. at art. 5-2-7.
97. See id. at art. 5-2-10.
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minimum time period, the length of which does not vary in any great
measure. Under U.S. law, a tender offer (regardless whether the securi-
ties are registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act) must be held
open for a minimum of twenty business days.98 In addition, if either a
change in the offer price or number or percentage of outstanding shares
occurs, the offer must remain open for at least ten days after such
change. 99 The French rules also contemplate a twenty trading day mini-
mum offer period.100 The City Code provides that an offer must be held
open for at least twenty-one calendar days after posting (which can
mean up to forty-nine days from the first announcement), subject to
extension where the bid terms are revised. If the offer becomes uncondi-
tional, it must remain open for at least an additional fourteen calendar
days to enable others to accept. l0t The new German Takeover Code
contemplates a minimum offer period of twenty-eight calendar days.10 2
A requirement in some countries prohibiting offers from remaining
open longer than a specified period creates even more significant differ-
ences between regulatory systems. The U.K. rules require an offer to be
declared "unconditional as to acceptances" (i.e., the minimum accept-
ance level set for the offer must have been satisfied) within sixty calen-
dar days of the mailing of offer documents, 10 3 subject to limited
exceptions.0 4 Furthermore, the offer must be declared "wholly uncon-
ditional" (i.e., subject to no remaining conditions) within a further
twenty-one calendar days.0 5 The purpose of a maximum offer period is
to limit the disruption caused to the target of the takeover bid."0 6 Ger-
98. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1996).
99. See id. § 14e-l(b). The rule also requires a time extension if there is any change in a
dealer's soliciting fees.
100. See CMF REGULATIONS, supra note 94, at art. 5-2-10.
101. See CrrY CODE, supra note 6, at M2, rules 31.1 & 31.4.
102. See CGSH German Memo, supra note 61, at 28, art. 11. The bidder may agree to an
extension of the offer period with the Takeover Commission in the event of a revision in the offer
terms. See id. at 29, art. 14.
103. See CrrY CODE, supra note 6, at M4, rule 31.6. If offerors do not achieve this minimum
level, the offer is said to "lapse." See id. at M5.
104. See id. at M4, rule 31.6(a)(i-iii). Extension will "normally only be granted" where a
competing bid is announced, where the target's board of directors consents to the extension or
where the target announces its results between days 39 and 60 of the offer. See id. at M7, rule
31.9 (target should avoid announcing trading results, profit or dividend forecasts, asset valuations
or proposals for dividend payments after day 39 of the offer). Rule 31.9 also presumes that such
announcements may drive the share price up, requiring the bidder to increase the value of its offer.
Accordingly, where an announcement is made in the ordinary course and does "not appear likely
to influence materially the outcome of the offer," the Panel will not generally require that the
maximum offer period by extended. Id.
105. See id. at M6, rule 31.7. For offers declared unconditional as to acceptances prior to the
sixtieth day of the offer, Rule 31.7's twenty-one day limit begins at the earlier date.
106. See Neil Harvey, Conduct During the Offer; Timing and Revision; and Restrictions
Following Offers, in A PRAcrmiONER's GUIDE, supra note 34, at 158.
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many's new Takeover Code contains a similar time restriction, requiring
that the offer period not exceed sixty calendar days. 07 In contrast, U.S.
rules contain no such provision, a tender offer can remain open indefi-
nitely.0 8 The same is true of the French rules although the CMF can
take steps to speed up the process if it becomes prolonged.1 9
The difference between the U.S. and U.K. rules could create diffi-
culties for Bidder. Suppose that Target's assets include a number of
regulated subsidiaries in the United States (e.g., state-regulated insur-
ance companies) changes in control of which are subject to regulatory
approval. Although the Panel has acknowledged that some delays
required by the regulatory approval process can require flexibility in the
application of the Code," 10 it has thus far resisted outright extensions of
the offer period where non-U.K. or European Union regulators are con-
cerned. For instance, in the 1989 offer by Hoylake Investments Limited
for B.A.T. Industries PLC,' " the U.K. Takeover Panel required Hoylake
to cause its offer to lapse after it became clear that it would be unable to
obtain certain U.S. regulatory approvals in time to comply with the City
Code. " 12
4. WITHDRAWAL RIGHTS
The term "withdrawal rights" refers to the ability of a tendering
shareholder to withdraw the shares prior to a bidder's purchase of them.
In tender offers for securities registered under section 12 of the U.S.
Exchange Act, withdrawal rights may be exercised until the tender offer
expires."1 3 There is no statutory requirement that withdrawal rights be
107. See CGSH German Memo, supra note 61, at 28, art. 11.
108. It should be noted, however, that especially in light of the steady increases in equity
values in the U.S. markets over the last two years, keeping bids open for extended periods of time
is likely to require regular upward revisions of offering prices.
109. If an offer has been open for more than ten weeks, the CMF can set a three day deadline
for filing of competing bids. See CMF REGULATIONS, supra note 94, at art. 5-2-21.
110. See CITY CODE, supra note 6, at M6, rule 31.6 n.4 (acknowledging that a delay in a
decision as to whether or not the proposed takeover will be referred to the U.K. Monopolies and
Mergers Commission or the European Commission on antitrust grounds may require extension of
the maximum offer period).
11. For a discussion of the Hoylake bid for B.A.T. Industries, see Meredith M. Brown and
Simon MacLachlan, When Worlds Collide: The Reconciliation of Conflicting Requirements in
Cross-Border Acquisitions, in 1 22ND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION, at 177,
193-97, 199-200 (PLI Corp. L. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 712, 1990).
112. See B.A.T. Industries PLC, Decision of the Appeal Committee of The Takeover Panel
(1989/21) (affirming an earlier Panel decision 1989/11) [hereinafter Hoylake Panel Decision]).
The Appeal Committee did give Hoylake permission to recommence its bid within twenty-one
days of gaining the U.S. approval at issue. This represented a significant accommodation since
pursuant to Rule 35.1(a) of the City Code, a lapsed bid cannot be recommenced for a 12 month
period. See CITY CODE, supra note 6, at NI, rule 35.1(a).
113. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a) (1996). As enacted, the Williams Act required only that
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provided if unregistered shares are sought. The French rules are similar
to section 12 and permit withdrawals until the offer closes."'t
Under the U.K. City Code, shareholders are entitled to withdraw
their acceptances during specified interludes and under certain circum-
stances.1 15 Unless the offer has already been declared unconditional as
to acceptances," 6 withdrawals must be permitted from the date which is
twenty-one calendar days after the "initial closing date"" 7 (the closing
date is typically twenty-one days after the mailing of the offer docu-
ment).t 18 As a result, if the offer has not been declared unconditional as
to acceptances within forty-two calendar days of its mailing, tendering
shareholders can withdraw their shares until the earlier of (a) the offer
"being declared unconditional as to acceptances," or (b) the final time
for lodging of acceptances." 9 After an offer is declared wholly uncon-
ditional, the bidder must keep the offer open for additional acceptances
for a subsequent fourteen day period, but during this period no with-
drawals are permitted. 20
Bidder will encounter a conflict between the U.S. rules and the City
Code in both the initial forty-two day withdrawal period and the
required fourteen day "subsequent offer" period. United States law
requires that withdrawal rights be available throughout this period. The
SEC has granted two types of relief with respect to withdrawal rights;
directly, by enabling the offer to proceed in conformity with City Code
rules 12' and indirectly, by permitting simultaneous offers to proceed in
withdrawal rights be available (i) for the first seven days after publication of the offer and (ii)
during the period commencing 60 days from the date of the original offer. See 15 U.F.C.
§ 78(d)(5) (1994). However the SEC, through its rule making capability, extended the withdrawal
period. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1996). See also SEC Release No. 34-35333 (February 6,
1995).
114. See CMF REGULATIONS, supra note 94, at art. 5-2-11.
115. See CITY CODE, supra note 6, at M13, rule 34.
116. An offer can be declared unconditional as to acceptances at any point. Where the bidder
holds more than 50% of the outstanding shares at the commencement of the offering, the offer
may be unconditional as to acceptances from its inception.
117. See supra text accompanying note 101.
118. See Crr CODE, supra note 6, at M13, rule 34.
119. See id.
120. See id. at M2, rule 31.4.
121. See In the Matter of Bell Cablemedia PLC, Exchange Act Release No. 38030, 1996
LEXIS 3367 (December 9, 1996) [hereinafter Cable & Wireless Communications].
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the U.S. and U.K., 12 2 each in accordance with the local rules.' 23
The interrelated tender and exchange offers which resulted in the
1997 creation of Cable & Wireless Communications PLC ("CWC")
involved this first approach. 2 4 Bell Cablemedia PLC ("BCM"), a U.K.
company, conducted a tender offer for the shares (including ADSs) of
Videotron Holdings PLC ("Videotron"), also a U.K. company. Video-
tron ADSs were listed on the NASDAQ National Market, with approxi-
mately 18% of its shares held by U.S. persons. 2 5 As part of the
transaction, simultaneous exchange offers were also conducted for
BCM's shares and shares of two subsidiaries of NYNEX Corporation
(one a U.K. subsidiary, the other a U.S. subsidiary), in each case by the
newly formed CWC entity. The tender offer and the exchange offer
were each conducted as a single offer, structured to comply with both
City Code and Williams Act requirements.
The SEC, at the bidders' request, issued an exemptive order that
allowed the bidders to utilize a fourteen day "subsequent offer period"
after the offer was declared unconditional, with no right of withdrawal
for shares tendered during the period. 26 However, in a departure from
U.K. practice, tendering shareholders could withdraw their securities at
any time prior to the initial closing date and during any extension period.
A declaration that the offer was unconditional as to acceptances would
only serve to "lock up" tendering shareholders if it was made during an
extension of the original offer period. 127
The Ford Motor Company Limited's 1989 takeover of Jaguar PLC
exemplifies the second approach. 128 Jaguar, a U.K. public limited com-
pany, had ordinary shares listed on the London Stock Exchange and
ADSs representing over 25% of the ordinary shares quoted on the NAS-
DAQ National Market. 129 Ford structured its bid for Jaguar as two sepa-
rate tender offers at the same price, conducted simultaneously in the
122. See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Company Limited Offer to Purchase the Ordinary Shares and
American Depositary Receipts of Jaguar PLC, Exchange Act Release No. 34-27425, 1989 SEC
LEXIS 2161 (November 7, 1989) [hereinafter Ford/Jaguar].
123.
124. This represents an accommodation in and of itself since the Exchange Act requires equal
treatment of all shareholders. However, this rule is inapplicable if the SEC determines, "either
unconditionally or on specified terms," that compliance is not necessary or appropriate. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-I0(e).
125. See Cable & Wireless Communications, supra note 121.
126. The BCM offer for Videotron was a "mandatory" offer under City Code Rule 9. 1. The
mandatory offer was knowingly triggered by BCM after an acquisition resulted in it holding over
80% of Videotron's shares. For a discussion of mandatory offers under the City Code, see supra
notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
127. See Cable & Wireless Communications, supra note 121, at *5-7.
128. See id. at *7-8.
129. See Ford/Jaguar, supra note 122.
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United States and the United Kingdom. 3 '
Despite the dual offer structure, Ford sought exemptive relief from
the SEC in order to conduct a fourteen day subsequent offer period, as
permitted by the City Code, without any right of withdrawal for shares
tendered during the period."3 The SEC granted the relief and confirmed
that the simultaneous offerings did not violate the Exchange Act's "all-
holders" requirement.1 32
5. PURCHASES OUTSIDE THE BID
If Bidder hopes to purchase any of Target's shares outside the for-
mal offer (e.g., in a private transaction with a target shareholder),
another area of conflict arises. Contrary to the laws of most European
countries, U.S. securities laws, specifically Rule lOb-13 under the
Exchange Act, prohibit bidders or their financial advisors (including
such advisors' market-making affiliates) from purchasing a target com-
pany's securities other than through the tender offer.' 3 3 This prohibition
applies regardless of whether the bid is for securities registered under
section 12 of the Exchange Act.
The existence of Rule lOb-13 is explained by the fact that in partial
tender offers under U.S. law, which are either not permitted or generally
not practicable under the laws of many other countries, shareholders
must be treated on a pro rata basis if the offer is oversubscribed.'
34
Allowing bidders to purchase outside the offer would circumvent the pro
rata rule because it would allow outside sellers to obtain a premium
price for all of their shares while limiting those tendering through the
formal offer in the number of shares they could sell.' 35 Even purchases
outside the United States could violate Rule lOb-13.
A bidder in the United Kingdom can purchase shares prior to, as
well as in the market during the offer, but the bidder must pay those
shareholders tendering through the formal mechanism at least as much
as other sellers received from the bidder during the bid and the three
month period preceding the bid.' 36 This rule provides shareholder pro-
tection similar to the U.S. rule, but in a less formalistic manner. In addi-
130. See id. at *1. ADSs do not need to be registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act in
order to be quoted on NASDAQ, but their underlying ordinary shares must be.
131. See id. at *2.
132. See id. at *34.
133. Id. at *5.
134. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)-13(c) (1996). The SEC also takes the position that, where a
bid is a "friendly bid" (or, in U.K. parlance, an "agreed bid"), Rule l0b-13 prohibits such
purchases by the target and its advisors.
135. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1994).
136. In addition to Rule lOb-13, there are other investor protections in place in partial offer
context. See C.F.R. § 240.14e-4 (1996).
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tion, under U.K. rules, an "exempt market maker" connected to the offer
by virtue of its affiliation with the bidder's financial advisors is permit-
ted to carry on its normal market making activities in the target's securi-
ties, subject to certain reporting requirements and other limitations.' 13 7
Recognizing the differences between the relevant American and
British rules, and in light of the obligation under London Stock
Exchange rules for a market-maker to carry on its activities at all times,
the SEC has in the past, subject to certain conditions, provided relief
from the Exchange Act's prohibition against purchasing outside the bid
to permit such market-making activity outside the United States.' 38 The
SEC has also considered providing a blanket exemption for such market-
making activities in the context of U.S./U.K. takeover bids. 139 The con-
ditions that the SEC has placed on market-making activities were similar
to those in the SEC's proposed exemptive order. 40
The French and German' 4' rules regarding market purchases by the
bidder are quite similar to the U.K. rules. In France, a takeover bidder
who purchases in the market at a price higher than that contained in its
offer will see its offer price automatically increased to the higher of
102% of the current offer price, or the actual price paid, regardless of the
number of securities purchased. 4 2 Market-makers complying with reg-
ulatory obligations are also exempt from certain restrictions on dealings
137. See CITY CODE, supra note 6, at EIO, rule 6. See also id. at rules 5 and 9.
138. See id. at QI-2, rule 38. An exempt market maker must report all purchases and sales
(including the price thereof), as well as other related information, no later than the day following
such purchase or sale. See id. at Q2, rule 38.5.
139. See, e.g., Ford/Jaguar, supra note 122, at 4-5 (during bid); In re Hanson PLC & HB
Acquisitions PLC Offers to Purchase the Ordinary Shares and American Depositary Receipts of
Beazer PLC, Exchange Act Release No. 34-29835, 1991 SEC LEXIS 2346 (October 18, 1991)
(during compulsory acquisition period under U.K. rules); Enterprise Oil PLC & Lasmo PLC, SEC
No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 459 (April 27, 1994) (providing relief from rules
1Ob-6 and 1Ob-13 to permit Enterprise and advisors to purchase outside the U.S. during the bid);
offers by Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. & BFI Acquisitions PLC for Attwoods PLC, SEC No-
Action Letter, SEC No-Act. LEXIS 697 (Sept. 19, 1994) (permitting bidders purchase of certain
shares at lower price than that available to the public as well as allowing purchases outside the
offer); Glaxo P.L.C. offer for Wellcome PLC, SEC No-action Letter, SEC No-Act. LEXIS 213
(February 7, 1995) (permitting Glaxo and advisor to purchase shares in open market, subject to
U.K. rules and certain disclosure and reporting obligations).
140. See SEC Tender Offer Proposal, supra note 2, at *94-97. However, the SEC has never
granted relief from the trading rules to permit purchases outside the offer within the United States.
141.. The conditions were (1) that the disclosure documents filed in the United States in
connection with the offer state that such purchases were possible, (2) that all such purchases take
place outside the United States, and (3) that the market-makers concerned disclosed in the United
States all purchases made by them on the same basis as required by the City Code. See id. at *95.
142. See e.g., CGSH German Memo, supra note 61, at 29, art. 13. The bidder must also advise
the German Takeover Commission of any transactions it undertakes in the target's securities. Id.
art. 12.
19971
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in target shares. 4 3
6. DEFENSIVE TACTICS
Although hostile bids are colorful affairs on both sides of the Atlan-
tic Ocean,1 44 one of more striking differences between U.S. and foreign
corporation law is the ability of U.S. companies to implement defensive
tactics, such as poison pills, to repel active bidders and discourage
potential ones.
Poison pills usually take the form of warrants or rights issued as a
dividend and traded as a unit with shares. The most popular type of
poison pill, the "flip in," provides that if a specified percentage of an
issuer's stock is acquired, all other shareholders receive the right to
purchase the issuer's stock at a deep discount to the market price. This
dilutes the acquiror's percentage ownership and the value of the invest-
ment. When such circumstances do not exist, the exercise price is far in
excess of the share's market price. Furthermore, the issuer's board
retains the ability to redeem the rights at any time for nominal considera-
tion. As a result, in the absence of a takeover, the rights have no eco-
nomic significance. U.S. corporations are increasingly aggressive at
setting the percentage of ownership that will cause the right to "flip-in."
While the first "flip-in" pills had percentages of 50%, levels of 20%, and
in many cases 10%, are now common.
United States federal securities laws do not address a corporation's
ability to adopt poison pills measures. As in most areas of corporate
governance, the laws of the state of incorporation control. In most
states, a board can successfully resist a legal challenge to a defensive
strategy by establishing that it had reasonable grounds for believing that
a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness existed, and that the defen-
sive measures adopted were reasonable in relation to the threat posed. 145
Courts are generally deferential to the directors' judgment. As a result,
boards enjoy considerable discretion to adopt poison pills and other
structural defenses against hostile takeovers, including "lock-up" provi-
sions and "no-shop" clauses. 146
Under the U.K. City Code, any actions taken to frustrate a bid must
143. See SCHOEN, supra note 81, at art. 5-2-23.
144. See id. at art. 5-2-17(c) (exempting certain market makers from special restrictions on
target shares traded on the monthly settlement market).
145. See e.g., Morgan Crucible Co. PLC v. Hill Samuel Bank Ltd., 3 ALL E.R. 330, 331 (ch.
1990) ("The formal offer document went out on 17 December. The usual exchange of boasts and
insults followed.").
146. The first part of the test can be satisfied by the board's demonstration that they acted in
good faith and with reasonable investigation.
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be approved by the target's shareholders.147 However, the difficulties of
engineering a vote within the City Code's compressed timetable, plus
the average shareholder's preference for a bidder's premium over a
potentially management-entrenching defense strategy by the target,
make the City Code's rule a fairly flat prohibition. This prohibition
applies as soon as the target has reason to believe that an offer is going
to be made. Amongst other things, it prevents the target from issuing
any additional shares in the company (even where previously author-
ized),148 granting options over unissued shares 149 or making any disposal
or acquisition of a material amount of assets.' 50
As in the United States, defensive actions in the United Kingdom
have, by local standards, engendered a fair amount of litigation. While
the issues in the U.S. courts typically resolve around whether the direc-
tors complied with their fiduciary obligations in adopting a particular
defensive measure, the question before the U.K. Takeover Panel is gen-
erally more basic: Did the steps taken by the target constitute prohibited
"frustrating action?"
Two recent, well publicized takeovers illustrate the difficult ques-
tions that this seemingly simple exercise can pose. In the Hoylake take-
over bid for BAT Industries, t"' BAT undertook various activities in the
United States which Hoylake asserted were designed to frustrate its take-
over bid. The actions included lobbying politicians and others in the
United States who, in the words of the Panel, "might influence the out-
come of the offer,"' 52 involving itself in a "substantial" way in certain
state insurance regulatory investigations, and intervening in various
legal proceedings instituted by Hoylake in federal court to avoid the
need to obtain state approval.' 53 The Panel rejected the claim that these
147. "Lock-up" provisions are options granted to a bidder on target securities or assets which
become exercisable if another bidder acquires the target at a higher price. "No-shop" clauses are
covenants that prohibit a target from soliciting or accepting other acquisition offers.
148. See CITY CODE, supra note 6, at B2, general principle 7. See also id. at 113, rule 21.
149. A U.K. organized company cannot hold what in the U.S. are commonly referred to as
"treasury shares." A U.K. company must immediately retire any shares purchased or redeemed by
it. See Companies Act 1985, § 160(4) (Eng.).
150. See CITY CODE, supra note 6, at 115, rule 21 n.7 (where target proposes to grant options in
accordance with normal practice under an employee or executive share option plan, "panel will
normally give its consent").
151. In addition, the target may not enter into any contracts otherwise than in ordinary course
of business. See id. Rule 21's notes set out some additional thoughts on what may be frustrating
actions. See id. at n.3 (declaration and payment of dividends otherwise than in the ordinary
course); id. at n.6 (amending or entering into an employment agreement with, or varying the terms
of employment of, a director "otherwise than in the ordinary course of business"); id. at n.8 (Panel
must be consulted before taking action that will affect target's pension arrangements).
152. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
153. Hoylake Panel Decision, supra note 112, at 2. According to the Panel decision, Hoylake
claimed that BAT had arranged for 200 members of Congress to sign a letter to the then Secretary
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efforts constituted "frustrating actions." '154
The panel was less forgiving of the efforts of Consolidated Gold
Fields PLC ("Consolidated"), a U.K. public limited company, to fore-
stall its acquisition by Minorco S.A., a Luxembourg corporation, by fil-
ing antitrust and securities fraud actions in the U.S. federal courts.
155
Although Consolidated succeeded in securing an injunction on the anti-
trust issue, the Panel ordered Consolidated to withdraw its U.S. court
actions. 156 Minorco's victory was bittersweet, however, because a 49%
owned affiliate of Consolidated was also pressing an action against
Minorco in the U.S. courts. The Panel determined that because of Con-
solidated's minority position, the Panel could not require Consolidated
to cause its affiliate to withdraw its action. The antitrust injunction
remained in place and Minorca's bid lapsed. 157
Since the Hoylake and Minorco takeovers, U.K. companies have
become more subtle in their defensive maneuvers. For instance, in addi-
tion to the "usual exchange of boasts and insults"1 58 that hostile U.K.
takeovers reportedly engender, a number of targets have recently added
"sweeteners" to their defensive rhetoric. The recent announcement by
Southern Electric, a U.S. company, that it planned a bid for National
Power PLC, one of the U.K. electricity generators privatized by Her
Majesty's Government in the early 1990s, was met with a statement
from National Power's management that it would declare a special £1
billion dividend if the bid failed.' 59 The U.K. electricity distributor
Northern Electric took a similar tack, effectively promising shareholders
a windfall if they resisted Trafalgar House's takeover bid.160 The Take-
of State, James Baker, stating that "foreign financiers are seeking to buy up America," and urging
him to communicate "concern" about the bid to the U.K. government. Id. at 9.
154. See text accompanying supra note 6.
155. See Hoylake Panel Decision, supra note 112, at 12. The Panel determined that: (i)
lobbying is a "democratic right" with which the Panel should not interfere; (ii) participation in
state regulatory proceedings may be necessitated by duties to shareholders and insurance
policyholders and are thus entitled to deference, and (iii) intervention by BAT in Hoylake's
federal court action was "essentially linked to ... regulatory process" and thus permissible. See
id. at 12-15. The Panel did acknowledge, however, that the "taking of legal proceedings" under
other circumstances might run afoul of General Principle 7. Id. at 14.
156. See Consolidated Gold Fields, PLC v. Anglo American Corporation of South Africa Ltd.,
698 F. Supp. 487, 495-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding inter alia, that notwithstanding Minorca's
efforts to avoid the jurisdictional means, there were enough significant U.S. effects to justify
extraterritorial application of U.S. antifraud laws.
157. See Brown & MacLachlan, supra note 111, at 192-93.
158. See id. at 193.
159. See supra text note 142.
160. Michael Harrison, National Power gives pounds 1.2 bn back to investors, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), May 18, 1996, at 18 ("bumper handout.., as a means of defending itself
against a potential bid").
[Vol. 51:823
1997] TOWARD A COHESIVE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH 851
over Panel did not view either of these steps as "frustrating action."'' 61
Other European regulations also limit permissible defensive actions
by targets, although not to the same extent as the City Code, a fact which
rankles British financial players.' 62 For instance, a French company
can, prior to the commencement of a bid, take a number of steps
designed to discourage potential hostile bidders. This action is, as else-
where, subject to the directors' compliance with their fiduciary duties.
For instance, a corporation's bylaws can limit the exercise of any one
shareholder's voting rights as long as the shareholder does not hold a
majority of the shares. 163 This means that bidders who acquire 45%
percent of a company's outstanding shares may be unable to exercise
control even if the other shareholdings are widely dispersed.' 64 French
shareholders can enter into right-of-first-refusal agreements and cross-
shareholding arrangements with friendly parties provided they disclose
such agreements to the COB and the CMF and to the public through
press releases. 65
After a bid is commenced, a target's options become far more lim-
ited under the French rules. The principal defensive measures that
French companies employ include encouraging a friendly bid by a
"white knight" and/or legally challenging the hostile offer in court or
before the antitrust authorities. 166
The new German Takeover Code, in principle at least, takes an
approach similar to the U.K's. It prohibits targets from taking measures
that "run counter to the interests of the holders of securities in taking
advantage of the tender offer," unless the target obtains shareholder
approval. 167 However, the German Code also provides that contracts
entered into prior to the commencement of a bid may be honored, creat-
ing at least the potential for pre-bid defensive steps. 168
7. DISCLOSURE
United States and United Kingdom rules may require both Bidder
and Target to provide regulators and shareholders with specified infor-
mation. In a U.S./U.K. cash-only offer, these requirements do not raise
161. See Mary Fagan, Northern Telecom brings out sweeteners, THE INDEPENDENT (London),
July 22, 1995, at 18.
162. See Kirstin Ridley, Trafalgar Loses Appeal on Northern Bid, THE REUTERS EUROPEAN
BUSINESs REPORT (London), Mar. 17, 1995.
163. "The U.K. government would like to see a stiffening of the rules throughout Europe to
create a more level playing field ...." Harvey, supra note 105, at 155.
164. See CODE DEs SociErTES, supra note 75, at 282, art. 177.
165. See Schoen, supra note 81, at I10-11.
166. See id. at 115-16.
167. See id. at 124.
168. CGSH German Memo, supra note 60, at 31, art. 19.
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serious conflicts. However, in an exchange-offer context, the different
disclosure regimes, with related liability risks, can frequently lead to
exclusion of U.S. shareholders from the bid.
Disclosure by Bidder
In the United States, because Target's shares are listed on NAS-
DAQ and are, accordingly, registered under section 12 of the Exchange
Act, Bidder will be required to make a filing on Schedule 14D-1169 and
to amend the filing to reflect any material changes in the information. 170
Even if the target's securities are not registered under section 12,
making Section 14D inapplicable, a bidder still needs to prepare a dis-
closure document containing the terms of the offer, if only for informa-
tional purposes. In addition, under the Exchange Act's anti-fraud
provisions, if a party possesses material non-public information regard-
ing an issuer's securities, such knowledge may trigger an obligation to
either disclose the non-public information or refrain from purchasing the
securities.1 71 Accordingly, a bidder may need to disclose certain infor-
mation in its possession that is not necessarily related to the offer or its
terms.
The City Code sets out specific information requirements for the
offer document where the offeror is incorporated under the Companies
Act 1985 (or its predecessors) 72 and listed on the London Stock
Exchange. 73 Much of this information is similar to that required by
Schedule 14D-1. t 74 In addition, both bidders and targets must provide
information relating to their business, finances and operations (regard-
169. See id.
170. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(a)(1) (1996). For a summary of the Schedule 14D-I
requirements, see supra note 85.
171. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(b) (1996).
172. See generally, EDWARD F. GREENE & DAVID A. CHRISTMAN, United States, in
INTERNATIONAL INSIDER DEALING, 3, 7-8 (Mark Stamp et al. eds., 1996). Furthermore, pursuant to
the Exchange Act, if "substantial steps" have been taken toward the commencement of a tender
offer, a person in possession of non-public information which such person knows or has reason to
know has been acquired from either the target or the bidder (or their agents), violates the law by
trading in the target's stock without disclosing the information. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3; see also
GREENE & CHRISTMAN, supra, at 28.
173. Almost all U.K. companies are incorporated under one of the Companies Acts, the first of
which was recognized in 1948. See L.C.B. GOWER, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW, 3-4,
(3d ed. 1969). Only companies organized before 1860, and certain specialized entities (e.g., trade
unions, trusts and building societies, which are similar to thrifts) remain outside the ambit of these
acts.
174. See CrrY CODE, supra note 6, at J2, rule 24.2(a)(i). This includes the London Stock
Exchange's Unlisted Securities Market or its Alternative Investment Market. See id. If a bidder is
not incorporated under the Companies Act 1985 (or one-of its predecessors), and is not listed on
the London Stock Exchange, then alternative information is required. See id. at J2-3, rule 24.2(b).
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less of whether listed on the London Stock Exchange).' 75 The directors
of each company providing such information must acknowledge respon-
sibility for the statements contained in the document. Additionally, the
"Panel regards financial advisers as being responsible to the Panel for
guiding their clients and any relevant public relations advisers with
regard to any information released during the course of an offer."'176
Disclosure by Target
Under the Exchange Act, Target's management must issue a state-
ment to its shareholders recommending either acceptance or rejection of
Bidder's offer, indicating that it is adopting a neutral stance, or stating
that it is unable to take any position.' 77 The statement must be sent to
shareholders within ten business days from the date the offer is first
published.
The City Code requires Target to circulate its views on the offer,
including any alternative offers, and to inform its shareholders of any
advice it receives from its independent advisors. 78 If the response doc-
ument contains the financial advisor's recommendation or opinion, it
must also include a statement that the advisor consents to the issuance of
the document. Target must advise shareholders of its view within four-
teen calendar days of the offer being commenced. 179
Exchange Offer
In addition to the disclosure required in a cash-only offer, under the
U.S. rules, if Target shareholders are to be offered Bidder shares (either
in lieu of or in addition to cash), Bidder must register the offered shares
with the SEC. The registration statement designated for use by a non-
175. See id. at rule 24.2(a) (describing the financial and other information required with respect
to the offeror). The information includes financial statements for the preceding three years as well
as any subsequent interim statements; a statement of assets, liabilities and cash flow as published
in the last audited accounts as well as all material changes in the financial or trading position of
the company since the last audited accounts; any inflation adjusted information and significant
accounting policies including descriptions of variations of figures resulting from any change in
accounting policy; the directors' names; the nature of the business; a description of any material
contracts entered into in the last two years; and, if the company is not incorporated under the
Companies Act 1985 with listed shares, information on any person having an investment in the
offeror such that he may have a potential or direct interest in the capital of the offeree. See id. at
J3-4.
176. See id. at J5, rules 24.2(a) & (c). These rules require the offer document to include
financial statements for the preceding three fiscal years as well as certain accounting information
and a list of each company's directors. This rule also requires the bidder to provide a description
of the nature of its business, and of its financial and trading prospects, and a summary of each
material contract (other than ordinary course contracts) it, or its subsidiaries, has entered into
during the preceding two years. See id.
177. See id. at J3, rule 19.2(a).
178. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2(a). The statement must be made in conformance with Schedule
14D-9. See id. § 240.14d-9.
179. See CITY CODE, supra note 6, at J12, rule 25.1.
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U.S. bidder's exchange offer requires: (1) a detailed description of the
terms of the offer, (2) a business description of both the bidder and the
target, (3) audited balance sheets for the two most recent fiscal years,
and (4) audited income statements for the three most recent fiscal years
(accompanied by auditors' opinions and consents). In addition, if the
acquisition is material to the bidder, a pro forma income statement and
balance sheet must be prepared, intended to present the business that
will result from a successful takeover. This historical and pro forma
financial information is more extensive than that required by the U.K.
City Code.
The City Code does not contain any significant additional disclo-
sure requirements in connection with an exchange offer. 80 However,
under certain circumstances, "listing particulars" conforming with the
London Stock Exchange Yellow Book requirements may be required. 8
In addition, under the Financial Services Act ("FSA"), most exchange
offer documents will be regarded as "investment advertisements," which
can only be offered by an "authorized person." The FSA contains its
own antifraud provisions, violation of which can result in civil or crimi-
nal liability.' 82
The cost and timing delays inherent in registering Bidder's securi-
ties with the SEC may make an exchange offer in the U.S. impracticable
if it hopes to meet the City Code's timetable. The SEC has shown some
willingness to be flexible with non-U.S. bidders 83 in this area as well as
with respect to the information contained in exchange-offer registration
statements relating to cross-border acquisitions. For instance, when
Blockbuster Entertainment Corporation, a U.S. company, made an offer
for Cityvision PLC, the SEC agreed to permit the bidder's registration
statement to contain information on the target that was broadly consis-
tent with that required by the U.K. rules. In addition, the SEC did not
require Blockbuster's and City Vision's financial advisors to consent to
the registration statement's references to them, thus excepting them from
the relatively stringent liability regime normally applicable to so-called
"experts."184
The bidder's difficulties are compounded when both it and the tar-
180. See id. at Ml, rule 30.2.
181. Cf. id. at Jll, rule 24.4 (where securities are offered as consideration, effect of the
acquisition on the emoluments of the bidder's directors must be discussed); rule 24.10 (offer
document must contain an independent estimation of the value of any unlisted securities offered
by a bidder).
182. Listing particulars are required where the exchange-offer bidder is listed on the London
Stock Exchange.
183. See Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 5 § 57 (Eng.).
184. For instance, the SEC may be willing to review drafts of the registration statement on an
expedited, confidential basis.
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get are non U.S. reporting issuers, because the bidder must provide
financial information relating to the target similar to that provided in its
own stead. This information must be reconciled to U.S. Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP"). However, the SEC has
been flexible with respect to the requirement that the target information
be audited. Target information must be provided regardless of the tar-
get's and bidder's comparative sizes.
It bears mention that, outside the exchange offer context, where an
issuer's registration statement covers a period in which an acquisition
has just begun or is about to begin, historical and pro forma information
regarding the target and resulting business is only required where the
target's size or revenues makes the acquisition material to the issuer.
The SEC has recently changed the materiality thresholds for such
information. 185
Finally it should be noted that if both the bidder and the target are
U.S. reporting issuers, the registration process is relatively simple with
information relating to each entity being incorporated by reference in the
document. However the bidder must still disclose any non-public infor-
mation it has received and may be required to discuss the negotiations
that led to the bid.
C. Common Concerns
As is evident from the preceding discussion, the takeover rules of
various jurisdictions address certain common concerns. For instance, all
of the jurisdictions discussed above seek to ensure equal treatment of all
shareholders and adequate (unpressured) time for analysis of the offer by
shareholders. What constitutes the best means of achieving these goals
is, of course, what creates the observed differences between the systems.
Each takes a different view of how rules regarding mandatory offers,
purchases outside the offer, disclosure requirements and defensive
maneuvers can best serve the objectives. Ironically, while seeking what
are essentially similar protections, these differing regulatory systems
have created incompatibilities that hinder rather than help cross-border
transactions. As previously noted, U.S. shareholders are frequently
unable to participate in acquisitions of non-U.S. companies. As a result,
185. Section 7(a) of the Securities Act requires "experts," such as accountants or engineers,
who are mentioned in the registration statement as having prepared or certified any part of the
registrations statement (e.g., financial statements), to consent to references to them therein. See 15
U.S.C. § 77g(a) (1994). Consenting experts may be sued for damages arising from material
misstatements or omissions in the document. See id. § 77k(a)(4). However, the SEC may waive
the consent requirement where it is impracticable for the registrant to obtain them or where to do
so would involve undue hardship. See id. § 77g(a). Hostile bidders frequently rely on this relief.
See 1 ISDM, supra note 54, at 7-14 n. 41.
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such shareholders lose the very protections the U.S. system is intended
to provide.
The difficulties of complying with largely procedural requirements
do not adequately explain the regularity with which U.S. shareholders
are excluded. Certainly in the exchange offer context, the extensive dis-
closure requirements under the U.S. rules and the uncertainties relating
to liability for bidders, targets and advisors are also significant contribut-
ing factors.
III. RECENT PROPOSALS FOR CROSS-BORDER TAKEOVERS
A. Proposals for Improving the U.S. Approach
This Part explores a number of proposals that have been made to (i)
ease the regulatory conflict between the takeover laws of the United
States and the laws and practices of other countries and (ii) create inter-
system accord on takeover rules.
1. THE SEC PROPOSALS
In 1990, the SEC issued a concept release indicating its desire to
encourage foreign bidders to include U.S. shareholders in cross-border
tender and exchange offers.'8 6 The SEC sought comment on the ques-
tion of whether (in situations in which a relatively small percentage of
the target's shares are located in the U.S.) it should permit foreign bid-
ders to make the offer into the U.S. based on the procedural rules and
disclosure practices of the bidder's home market.18 7 Among other
things, the SEC expressed the belief that accommodating foreign rules
would enable it to more freely assert its jurisdiction extraterritorially
without offending principles of international comity.' The Concept
Release underscored the SEC's view that U.S. securities laws apply to
any tender or exchange offer in which it is reasonably foreseeable that
the offer will result in excluded American investors selling their securi-
ties abroad or in the U.S. markets. It also foreshadowed the SEC's
intention to make the U.S. anti-fraud rules applicable to tender and
exchange offers, even where conducted in conformity with the foreign
company's home rules and practices.
Later that year, the SEC adopted a multi-jurisdictional disclosure
system ("MJDS") that enables Canadian companies to proceed in the
United States under Canadian procedural and disclosure rules if less than
186. Regulation S-X, Rule 3-05. Depending on the relative size of the target, the issuer must
provide historical financial information. Broadly speaking, the target company must be 20% of
the bidder's size or greater before such financial information is required.
187. See SEC Concept Release, supra note 10 at *1-3, *5-6.
188. See id. at *18-19.
[Vol. 51:823
1997] TOWARD A COHESIVE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH 857
40% of the target's securities are held by U.S. shareholders." 9 Under
the MJDS, a Canadian bidder in an exchange offer can, subject to certain
requirements, register its offered securities under the disclosure docu-
ments required under Canadian securities laws.' 9 0 Using such docu-
ments in the U.S. would subject the issuer to the civil liability and anti-
fraud provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.' 9'
Responses to the Concept Release were mixed. Among the com-
mentators was the Company Law Subcommittee of the City of London
Law Society (the "Law Society"), 92 which indicated that U.K. bidders
were not likely to adopt the SEC's Concept Release approach as long as
their domestic laws allowed them to exclude U.S. persons from partici-
pating in offers. The Subcommittee provided two reasons to support
their assertion. First, hostile bidders would be unwilling to accept the
U.S.'s high risk of litigation with a target, which could frustrate the bid.
Second, in an exchange offer, bidders and their directors and their
officers were not likely to agree to expose themselves to U.S. civil liabil-
ity standards under the Securities Act.
Likewise, in a letter to the SEC, the Committee on Federal Regula-
tion of Securities, Section of Business Law of the American Bar Associ-
ation (the "ABA Committee") indicated that application of U.S. anti-
fraud provisions would be an obstacle to foreign bidders allowing U.S.
shareholders to participate in 'tender and exchange offers.1 93
In 1991, the SEC published its Tender Offer Proposal. 94 The pro-
posal set forth three possible exemptive schemes designed to encourage
foreign bidders to include U.S. persons in foreign exchange and tender
offers. Essentially, the SEC proposed that, where 10% or less of a for-
eign company's outstanding shares are held by U.S. shareholders, the
SEC would generally exempt the bidder 9 ' from the U.S. securities laws
governing tender offers. To qualify, the bidder would have to (i) enable
U.S. shareholders to participate in the bid on terms no less favorable
189. See id. at *6 n.3.
190. See Proposed Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6879, 55 F.R. 46,288, at 46,322 (Nov.
2, 1990).
191. See id. at 46,288.
192. The SEC indicated in the release that good-faith compliance with Canadian disclosure
requirements would constitute compliance with U.S. disclosure requirements. Id. at 46,346.
193. See Comment Letter from Martin G. Chester, Chairman, Company Law Sub-Committee,
to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (Sept. 10, 1990) (File
No. S7-10-90, SEC Public Reference Room, Washington, D.C.); see also Comment Letter from
British Merchant Banking and Securities Association (Sept. 19, 1990) (on file with author) 4
(threat of litigation is "most important" reason for exclusion of U.S. shareholders).
194. See Comment Letter from James H. Cheek et al., Chairmen, Committee on Federal
Regulation of Securities, Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association (Sept. 20,
1990) (on file with authors). The letter is described in Fisch, supra note 56, at 540 n.10.
195. See SEC Tender Offer Proposal, supra note 2.
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than those offered to other holders; (ii) make any offering circular or
similar document required by the target's home country available to U.S.
investors (in English); and (iii) indicate that the offer and its related dis-
closures were being made in conformance with the rules of another
country. Under such circumstances, the SEC's tender offer disclosure
requirements, and the numerous U.S. procedural rules, would not
apply. 19
6
As the Concept Release suggested, under the Tender Offer Propo-
sal, the general antifraud provisions of the U.S. securities laws (includ-
ing the prohibition on insider trading) would apply to tender offers
conducted in accordance with the proposal.1 97 Irrespective of the ABA
Committee's and the Law Society's views, the SEC indicated that the
anti-fraud provisions should not prevent bidders from taking advantage
of the proposed scheme since, even if the offer were not disseminated in
the United States, the bidder would be liable for fraud both in the tar-
get's home country and in the United States "given the foreseeable effect
of ... fraud in the United States."'' 98
In the area of exchange offers, the SEC release acknowledged a
"much more difficult problem from a regulatory perspective. . . since an
exchange transaction involves the offer and sale of securities in the
United States, thereby establishing a continuing presence of the offering
person in the United States capital markets." 199 Nevertheless, the SEC
recognized that the costs and delays caused by the exchange-offer regis-
tration process had generally led bidders to exclude U.S. shareholders of
non-U.S. target companies. The SEC proposed a two-tier exemptive
system: one registration exemption where five million dollars or less of
securities were to be offered in the United States; and a simplified regis-
tration form (relying entirely on home country documents) for larger
qualifying exchange offers where U.S. shareholders owned 5% or less of
the target's shares.
Under the less-than-$5 million exemption, the offer would have to
be made available to U.S. holders on the same basis as to other share-
holders. However, if a state's "blue sky" laws did not have a compara-
ble exemption, the bidder could exclude U.S. shareholders in that state.
196. The exemption would be available for bids by both U.S. bidders and non-U.S. bidders for
non-U.S. companies. An equivalent exemption under proposed Rule 13e-4(b) was to be available
for bids by a non-U.S. company to repurchase its own shares, although many countries do not
permit companies generally to repurchase their own shares.
197. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text. In addition, under the proposal, a bidder
in an exempt tender offer would be permitted to make purchases outside the offer (but not in the
United States) if permitted by the rules of the target's home country.
198. See SEC Tender Offer Proposal, supra note 2, at *7-8.
199. Id. at *35.
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Securities issued under this exemption would be freely tradable in the
United States. Therefore, the bidder would not become subject to peri-
odic reporting requirements.
The simplified registration statement exemption would permit eligi-
ble bidders2"' to register securities in the United States using English
language documents prepared in accordance with the requirements in the
target company's home country. For example, no U.S.-styled financial
statements, or reconciliation to U.S. GAAP would be required.
The registration statement would be filed with the SEC on the day
the offering circular was filed in the target's home jurisdiction, and
would be effective upon filing. This would eliminate the delays nor-
mally involved in the U.S. registration process. Additionally, notwith-
standing its public offering of securities in the United States, a bidder
using the simplified registration statement would not become subject to
the SEC's periodic reporting requirements.0 1
Under either the less-than-$5 million exemption or the simplified
registration process, U.S. shareholders would have to be given the same
opportunity to participate in an exchange offer as other shareholders
(except that residents of a particular state could be excluded if the bidder
was unable to register the securities under such state's "blue sky" laws
(despite a good faith effort)), and the general anti-fraud provisions of the
U.S. securities laws would still apply for any material misstatements or
omissions.
In light of the fairly well-trod path established through various
exemptive orders involving bids for companies subject to the City Code,
the SEC also announced a proposal to formalize certain procedures
through a blanket exemptive order applicable to any tender offer for a
U.K. company subject to both the U.S. and U.K. regulatory schemes.
Under this proposed exemptive order, a U.K. takeover bid could proceed
simultaneously in the United States under the same procedures as were
authorized in Ford's bid for Jaguar.20 2 This exemption would not be
available if the U.K. target company (1) had more than fifty percent of
its voting securities directly or indirectly owned by U.S. residents, and
(2) was effectively run from the United States. In the case of an
200. Id. at *39.
201. A bidder would be eligible to use the procedure only if (i) it had shares listed or quoted on
one of 17 designated major non-U.S. stock exchanges and securities markets for at least three
years or (ii) it had at least three years of operations and a current "public float" (excluding shares
owned by affiliates) of at least $75 million. See id. at *51-52.
202. Such bidders would be required to furnish to the SEC (but not file formally) the
information required under a Rule 12g3-2(b) exemption both at the time of offer commencement
and thereafter so long as there are at least 300 U.S. holders of any class of its equity securities.
See id. at *68-70.
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exchange offer, bidders relying on the proposed exemptive order would
nevertheless be required to file an appropriate registration statement
regarding the securities being issued.
Under the proposal, bidders would have the choice of making either
concurrent offers (a la Ford/Jaguar) or unitary offers (a la Hanson/
Beazer), the central difference between the two being that a unitary offer
requires only one offer document, and all target company shareholders
would have withdrawal rights until the offer became unconditional as to
acceptances. Since the rules of the Takeover Panel do not require with-
drawal rights initially, if concurrent offers are made, two offer docu-
ments must be prepared and withdrawal rights would be available only
to U.S. shareholders of the target until the offer becomes unconditional
as to acceptances.
The SEC never adopted any of the schemes contained in the Tender
Offer Proposal. It is believed that the SEC's view was that the home-
country disclosure requirements in most non-U.S. jurisdictions were
insufficient to adequately protect U.S. investors or where disclosure
levels were adequate, that such disclosure was a by-product of local
market practice rather than compliance with local laws and regulations.
2. ACADEMIC PROPOSALS
A number of academic commentators have analyzed the U.S.
response to international cross-border acquisition activity by focusing on
the extraterritorial application of U.S. law in the takeover area. In addi-
tion to the concern raised in this article regarding the Williams Act's
impact on U.S. shareholders of non-U.S. target companies, these com-
mentators indicate that the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities
laws (as well as other U.S. laws) infringes on the sovereignty of foreign
nations, injuring international relations and occasionally provoking retal-
iatory measures.
One recent proposal calls for a legislative solution to the difficulties
posed when U.S. and foreign takeover laws clash.2 °3 The proposal sug-
gests that existing U.S. laws and regulations would remain applicable to
tender offers for securities of companies either incorporated under U.S.
law, listed on a U.S. national exchange, or registered under Section 12 of
the Exchange Act. The proposal also suggests that the Congress amend
the Exchange Act such that the Williams Act and Exchange Act anti-
fraud provisions would have no application to tender offers for securities
other than those described above.
A bidder's ability to take advantage of this proposed law would be
203. See id. at *82-97. Regarding the SEC's Ford/Jaguar relief, see supra notes 122-38 and
accompanying text.
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conditioned on (1) his providing U.S. shareholders with an English
translation of any tender offer disclosure required by his domestic mar-
ket, and (2) his extension of the offer to U.S. and non-U.S. investors on
"substantially equal terms." The author also suggests qualifying the lat-
ter of these two requirements in terms of substantial equality of offers.
That way, bidders could make cash offers to U.S. holders while concur-
rently making exchange offers in other markets. This enables the
exchange-offer bidder to "avoid the registration requirements of federal
law, so long as the U.S. investors receive substantially equal considera-
tion for their stock. ' 20 4
The proposal is intended to ensure that only foreign issuers who
choose to directly utilize U.S. capital market facilities (i.e., the national
exchanges), will be subject to extraterritorial application of U.S.
antifraud laws. 0 5 Other commentators agree that only through the
removal or limitation of application of the U.S. antifraud laws and regu-
lations can the U.S. hope to encourage non-U.S. bidders to include U.S.
shareholders in tender offers.20 6
This approach demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the
nature and function of the U.S. antifraud laws. They are, and were
intended to be, investor protection laws. Within the realm of antifraud
law then, it is not appropriate to attempt to determine who sought the
benefits of the U.S. market, but rather such analysis requires assessing
the purchasing investors' expectations. Such persons may have (as the
SEC has acknowledged) been willing to make their initial investment
decision on the basis of the target's home country disclosure practices.
However, that is not a justification for depriving those investors of the
fundamental antifraud protections provided by the U.S. securities laws
when a third party (the bidder) offers to either purchase those securities
or to exchange them for its own. Part IV discusses the authors' belief
that negating investor protections provided by the basic antifraud rules
of the Exchange Act is neither a realistic nor politically acceptable
approach to the problem of U.S. shareholders being excluded from
tender offers.2"7
204. See Fisch, supra note 56, at 573-575.
205. See id. at 573-74 & n.274.
206. Id. at 574. "With the benefit of this use comes the burden of complying with U.S. law."
Id. It bears mention that, even if the bidder's domestic rules regarding equal treatment of
shareholders were to permit them to bifurcate an offer so that U.S. holders could be offered cash
while non-U.S. holders were given a choice between cash and shares, the bidder might still have
to take extensive measures to avoid the need to register the shares for "flowback" into the United
States. See GREENE, supra note 55, at 7-21 (Hoylake bid ensured that shares provided to non-U.S.
holders would not be sold into U.S. for six-month period.)
207. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
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B. Proposals for Intersystem Approaches
1. DIRECTIVE 13
The Commission of the European Communities recently proposed
an amended 13th European Parliament and Council Directive on Com-
pany Law concerning Takeover Bids ("Directive 13" or the "Directive").
Directive 13 is a "framework" directive. It is intended to require Euro-
pean Union ("EU") member states to implement regulations ensuring the
observation of certain general principles in takeover conduct throughout
the EU.2 °8 The Directive sets out minimum standards with relatively
little specificity as to how they should be attained, and to allow member
states to create detailed rules "according to their national practices
"209
Directive 13 was originally proposed in 1989. After comment by
both the EU Economic and Social Committee and the European Parlia-
ment, it was revised in September 1990. Serious opposition from mem-
ber states derailed the proposal in 1991 until, after a period of dormancy,
in 1993 the European Commission initiated a "detailed consultation"
with the various member states that produced the current proposal. 210
The strenuous response which greeted the original Directive 13 proposal
both reveals the difficulty inherent in attempting to create uniform regu-
lation across national borders and helps explain the current proposal's
light, and perhaps overly politic, tread.
The Directive contemplates each member state's appointing a
"supervisory authority" charged with protecting minority shareholders,
ensuring that the requisite degree of information regarding bids is made
available, and policing the actions of target companies' boards of direc-
tors. The Directive indicates that these supervisory authorities should
have the power to waive certain national rules in order "to cope with a
great variety of circumstances which can arise in fast moving financial
208. In the cross-border acquisition context, negating the applicability of Rule lOb-5 would
create numerous problems. For example, a person selling shares to a non-U.S. bidder relying on a
materially misleading tender offer document would have no recourse in the U.S. courts to redress
their injury. At the same time, a person purchasing a bidder's shares while the bidder was
simultaneously providing false information in its domestic market (thereby driving up prices of its
unregistered shares in the United States), would have recourse to the U.S. courts.
209. These general principles are that (1) all shareholders of a target company "who are in the
same position" should be treated equally, (2) offerees should have sufficient time and information
to reach a properly informed decision, (3) the target board should act in the interests of the
company as a whole and especially with respect to the interests of shareholders, (4) false markets
should not be created in either the bidder's or target's securities, and (5) the target should not be
hindered in conducting its business for an unreasonably long time. See DIREC-riVE, supra note 20,
at art. 5.
210. See Explanatory Memorandum, Part 1.7 in Directive, supra note 20 [hereinafter
Explanatory Memorandum].
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markets."21' Furthermore, they should have the power to order the tak-
ing of certain measures which they deem necessary in connection with
bids.
The U.K.'s Takeover Panel is a clear model for the supervisory
authority that the drafters of Directive 13 have posited.2"2 Not surprisly
then, the Directive "does not exclude the possibility" that a member state
would appoint as its supervisory authority a self-regulatory body (such
as the Panel).2" 3 However, in order to comply with this concept of a
statutorily implemented system, countries wishing to utilize a Panel-like
body would effectively have to make it a creature, at least in name, of its
legislature. In light of the Takeover Panel's long-running role as a non-
legal body overseeing the most active takeover market in the European
Union,214 this possibility has raised the ire of both the U.K. financial
community 2 5 and the Panel itself.216
The Directive sets out what is essentially a "residence" test for
determining which member state's supervisory authority should oversee
a given bid. In all cases, the residence of the target will determine which
state's rules and procedures govern. Under the Directive, a member
state's supervisory authority would have jurisdiction if the target com-
pany has its "registered office" in that country and lists its shares on that
country's exchange.217 If the target has its registered office in one coun-
try and lists its shares in another, then the rules of the country in which
the target's shares were first listed and continue to be listed govern.2 18
This is in contrast with the current practice in the U.K. and France which
both premise jurisdiction on the country of organization. 9
The Directive goes beyond the jurisdictional issue and provides
211. See id. at 1. 1-3.
212. Id. at 111, art. 4.
213. See House of Lords SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TAKEOVER
BIDS, H.L., Thirteenth Report #32, Comm. Print 1996, [hereinafter U.K. SELECT COMMITTEE
REPORT] (European Commission told Committee that U.K. system was model for Directive 13).
214. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 210, at 1.11. Indeed the preamble to the
Directive indicates that it is "desirable to encourage the voluntary control exercised by self
regulatory bodies in order to avoid recourse to administrative or judicial action." Directive, supra
note 20, at preamble.
215. See U.K. SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 213, at 5. According to the Committee,
the United Kingdom annual number of takeover bids for companies listed in the United Kingdom
exceeds those in all other member states put together. See id.
216. If the Code were put "on a statutory footing," the U.K. Select Committee Report stated, it
would "put in jeopardy those qualities of the present regime most valued by companies,
shareholders and professional advisers alike, namely speed, and flexibility certainty." Id. at 3 1.
217. See, e.g., The Takeover Panel and the Thirteenth Directive on Company Law Concerning
Takeover Bids, 1 Takeover Panel Release (undated) ("takeover activity as carried out in the UK is
too complex and fast-moving to be satisfactorily regulated on a statutory basis").
218. See Directive, supra note 20, at art. 4., para. 2.
219. See id.
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varying degrees of guidance for implementing the other general princi-
ples on which it focuses. The most difficult area the drafters addressed
was whether minority shareholder protection necessitates a rule requir-
ing mandatory bids for all shares once a certain level of control has been
acquired. The original proposal called for a mandatory full bid under
such circumstances (as the City Code and French rules require), but seri-
ous objections to this approach were raised by some member states.22 °
As a result, the current Directive permits member states to adopt alterna-
tive methods of protecting minority shareholders, but requires member
states that "opt out" of the mandatory bid rules to "demonstrate that
these other means really give minority shareholders a proper protec-
tion."22' Furthermore, member states electing to require mandatory bids
can implement a rule requiring either a full or a partial bid.222
Another potentially contentious area which the Directive covers is
that of defensive maneuvers against hostile bids. The Directive requires
member states to pass rules prohibiting target boards from taking "any
action which may result in the frustration of the offer" without share-
holder approval. 223 However, the Directive makes no mention of pre-
offer actions that might deter potential bidders, and says very little about
what might constitute action resulting in frustration of a bid. 24
The Directive provides the most specific guidance about rule
implementation in the areas of disclosure and minimum bid periods.
With respect to disclosure, Directive 13 indicates that member states
should require a bidder to notify both the target and the relevant supervi-
sory authority prior to making any public announcement. The Directive
also sets out particular information that the formal offer document
should contain.225 It also requires that a copy of the offer document be
provided to the supervisory authority prior to the offer being made pub-
220. The U.K. Select Committee Report pointed out that the Directive's approach may, in
some circumstances, deprive the relevant supervisory authority of the "practical advantages in
having the [target] subject to the company laws of the same Member State as the supervisory
authority." U.K. SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 213, at 35.
221. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 210, at IlII, art. 3 (certain member states were
"particularly opposed" to the original Directive's proposed requirement that a full mandatory bid
be launched upon acquisition of control).
222. Id.
223. See Directive, supra note 20, at art. 10. The Directive contains two minimum standards
for the conduct of mandatory bids. The first requires any mandatory bid, whether for all "or for a
substantial part" of the shares, to be directed to all shareholders. The second requires that an
oversubscribed partial bid allow shareholders an opportunity to sell their shares on a pro rata
basis. The U.S. rules also permits partial offers, but Directive 13 is different because it does not
require any prohibition on purchases outside the offer. See supra notes 133-43 and accompanying
text.
224. Directive, supra note 20, at art. 8.
225. The Directive does, however, emphasize that "the issuing of shares which may result in a
lasting impediment to the offeror" is to be prohibited, Id. at art. 8.
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lic.12 6 Directive 13 also contemplates offers remaining open for a period
somewhere between four and ten weeks.227
The Directive represents an interesting, if somewhat tentative, step
towards an intersystem approach to takeover regulation. As noted, the
difficulty the drafters have faced in convincing member states to endorse
the prior proposals underscores the problem of reaching accord on cross
border regulations. This is especially true where the national systems
themselves are either products of local ingenuity and therefore a source
of national pride (for instance, the United Kingdom's), or where local
rules are undergoing rapid change (as France's laws were at the time of
the original Directive proposal). The revised Directive 13 attempts,
more than anything, to steer a clear course among the existing rules of
the various national schemes. Indeed, if the states do implement the
Directive, it will most likely be due to the fact that it will require only
minimal changes to the existing systems of the more active takeover
markets (principally the United Kingdom and France) than with it
requiring member states to take bold steps to harmonize their laws. 2 8
2. PROPOSALS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES
COUNCILS
Although its work has not touched extensively on the area of take-
over regulation, the International Organization of Securities Councils
("IOSCO") has been attempting for a number of years to coordinate var-
ious international efforts for uniform regulation of capital markets.
IOSCO is comprised of representatives of sixteen national securities
councils and commissions, including the SEC. Its coordinating efforts
thus far have been principally in the areas of accounting,22 9 clearance
and settlement, disclosure and information sharing.23 °
One of the tools IOSCO uses in coordinating regulatory efforts
between member countries is the "memorandum of understanding"
("MOU"). MOUs are statements of intent between regulatory authori-
ties. The statements contained in MOUs are not legally binding, and do
226. See id. at art. 6. This information parallels Rule 24 requirements in the City Code. See
CITY CODE, supra note 6, at J2- 1, rule 24.
227. See Directive, supra note 20, at art. 6, para. 2.
228. See id. at para. 3.
229. As the U.K. Select Committee Report noted, "[W]e gained the distinct impression that the
support for the Directive in the majority of other Member States is based upon the assumption
(which we believe to be correct) that they will not have to make any important changes to their
existing systems." U.K. SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 213, at 32.
230. See e.g., Trying to agree on global standards, CORP. ACCT. INT'L, (Jan. 1996), at 13
(describing agreement between IOSCO and the International Accounting Standards (IASs)
Committee on the use of IASs as the basis for a set of core accounting standards for use in cross-
border offerings).
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not take precedence over the signatories' local laws or regulations.
However, MOUs have become a common currency for cooperation
between regulators, for instance, in the context of information sharing
arrangements. 23' The SEC has entered into MOUs with regulators from
approximately 30 other countries.
232
Part IV.B of this Article puts forth a preliminary proposal for an
international regulatory response to the difficulties cross-border acquisi-
tions pose. In light of the problems inherent in reaching international
accord on takeover regulation (as evidenced by Directive 13's lengthy
incubation period and the tentative nature of its proposals) it is the
authors' belief that any meaningful international response will have to
proceed very slowly, with participants given sufficient latitude to
respond to changes in local and international practices. To that end, Part
IV.B will propose using MOUs as an initial step in the development of a
set of internationally acknowledged guidelines for use by takeover
regulators.
IV. Two PROPOSALS
The remainder of this Article puts forward two proposals. The first
is a proposal for the SEC to recommence its stalled efforts to encourage
the inclusion of U.S. shareholder in tender offers for non-U.S. compa-
nies. The second is more extensive. It is a proposal for using IOSCO to
create a working party to recommend a set of minimum takeover regula-
tion standards that participating countries would agree, through the use
of MOUs, to observe.
A. Proposal for SEC Action
A number of recent events make this a propitious time for the SEC
to take steps to encourage the inclusion of U.S. persons in bids for non-
U.S. companies. First, there has been considerable movement by non-
U.S. countries in the area of takeover regulation since the SEC's 1991
proposal. For instance, France, Germany and Switzerland have all intro-
duced, or will shortly be introducing, new or significantly amended take-
over rules. To the extent that the SEC Tender Offer Proposal has been
permitted to lie fallow due to concerns over the procedures and disclo-
sure practices in non-U.S. countries, these recent changes may have
231. See e.g., At the Annual Conference of the International Organization of Security Councils
(IOSCO), signing of an Information-sharing Agreement Between Securities Commissions, Bus.
WIRE (Canada), Sept. 16, 1996 (describing signing of a memorandum of understanding between
the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the New Zealand Securities Commission
regarding shared access to information regarding securities transactions).
232. See Working Party No. 4 of the Technical Committee, Int'l Org. of Sec. Comm'n,
Principles for Memoranda of Understanding 1 (Sept. 1991) (on file with authors).
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gone some way to addressing the SEC's concerns. Second, the European
movement towards creating a harmonized set of takeover standards for
European Union member states steadily increases the likelihood that
U.S. shareholders will continue to be excluded from takeovers. Finally,
assuming that the SEC reopens the question, the recently passed Capital
Markets Efficiency Act of 1996 may require the SEC to take substantive
action in light of the new requirements imposed upon it when it acts in
its rule-making capacity.233
1. TENDER OFFER PROPOSAL
The SEC should adopt rules to ensure that cash-only tender offers
for non-U.S. companies (regardless of whether the bidder is a U.S. com-
pany or not) are able to proceed on the basis of those procedural and
disclosure requirements the bidder is obligated to comply with (in most
cases, these will be dictated by the law or other relevant authority of the
country in which the target is resident).2 34 As further discussed in Part
IV.A.3. the U.S. antifraud rules would apply to the statements made by
the bidder in connection with the takeover attempt.
The theory behind this approach is that investors in non-U.S. com-
panies should be on notice that they may be subject to non-U.S. regula-
tion, both in connection with takeover rules and otherwise. To ensure
that this is the case, however, a concerted effort by issuers, regulators,
and financial intermediaries should be made to provide U.S. investors
(indeed all investors) with disclosure about the corporate governance
and takeover regulations that may apply to an interest in a given com-
pany's shares. For instance, the SEC should require non-U.S. registrants
to include such information in registration statements.235 Furthermore,
issuers selling shares in unregistered international or global offerings
should include such information as a matter of course. Finally, the
banks and other financial entities that act as ADR program depositaries
should provide ADR holders with information on the rights and respon-
sibilities of share ownership in the issuer's country.
233. D. Rhett Brandon & Glenn M. Reiter, Regulators Move to Harmonize Capital Markets
Rules, INT'L FIN. L. REV., June 1996, at 53, 54 (indicating that since the beginning of 1995, the
SEC has signed MOUs with Egypt, Israel, Russia, and others).
234. The Act requires that. under both the Exchange Act and the Securities Act, "[w]henever
pursuant to this title the Commission is ... required to consider or determine whether an action is
necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to
the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation." Capital Markets Efficiency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106(a)-(b), 110 Stat.
3416, 3424-25 (adding section 3(f) to the Exchange Act and section 2(b) to the Securities Act).
235. This proposal could be modified so as to limit its availability to bids conducted under the
laws of specified countries. Perhaps, eventually, to countries that have entered into MOUs as
described in Part IV.B.
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The approach being recommended is analogous to one which the
SEC has already adopted regarding proxy disclosure by non-U.S. com-
panies. Pursuant to Rule 3a12-3 under the Exchange Act, securities reg-
istered by foreign private issuers are exempt from the proxy rules
contained in section IX of the Exchange Act.
2. EXCHANGE OFFER PROPOSAL
As previously noted, the use of home disclosure creates greater dif-
ficulty in the context of an exchange offer than it does in the context of a
straight, cash-only tender offer. A shareholder faced with an exchange
offer is essentially being asked to make a potentially long-term invest-
ment in the bidder company. Furthermore, at least under some circum-
stances, the bidder will subsequently become subject to U.S. reporting
requirements.
Based on the analysis contained in Part IV.A.1 above, the case for
permitting the use of home country disclosure is strongest when the bid-
der and the target are subject to the same home-country requirements
(i.e., when they are residents of the same country, or when, under the
rules governing the bid outside the United States, the bidder must com-
ply with the requirements of the target's country). Under those circum-
stances, it is proposed that the bidder should be able to register the
securities being offered under the same kind of simplified registration
process as was proposed by the SEC in 1991. That is, the disclosure
requirements for use in the home country would form the basis of the
registration statement, which would be declared effective on filing, sub-
ject to (1) the documents containing adequate warning about the devia-
tion from normal U.S. disclosure requirements, (2) the bidder
acknowledging that its liability for any material misstatements and omis-
sions under both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, and (3) the
bidder filing a Form F-N with the SEC, identifying an agent for service
of process within the United States.
The case for the bidder using its home country disclosure is some-
what weaker where the bidder is using different disclosure criteria than
that required by the target's home country. In such cases, the U.S.
shareholders have not made their initial investment decision on the basis
of the bidder's domestic regulatory and disclosure practices. Under such
circumstances, the SEC should consider allowing the bidder to use the
simplified registration statement described in the preceding paragraph,
subject to the same requirements as in the same-country scenario, but
with the addition of (1) a summary of the salient differences between the
bidder's and target's home country disclosure and regulatory systems,
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and (2) a summary of the differences between the exchange offer docu-
ment and the one that the target's domestic rules requires.
In both the same-country and different-country scenarios, the analy-
sis is further complicated where the target company has elected or is
required to comply with U.S. reporting requirements (either as a result
of it being listed on a national exchange or otherwise). In that case, the
argument that the securities of U.S. investors were purchased on the
basis of home country disclosure is inapposite, and some measure of
additional information may need to be provided.236 As a starting point,
the authors would urge that the standards proposed by the SEC for avail-
ability of the simplified registration statement be reimplemented under
these circumstances (i.e., a bidder that has been listed on a recognized
non-U.S. exchange for a specified period of time should be able to use
its home country disclosure).237 Also, when a bidder does not comply
with U.S. GAAP (or IAS reporting), the SEC could require the addition
of an unaudited U.S. GAAP (or IAS reporting) reconciliation of its latest
financial statements. 38 Finally, in situations where a bidder does not
meet the listing criteria, then an audited U.S. GAAP (or IAS) reconcilia-
tion, and an MD&A comparing results for the two most recent fiscal
year-ends would be required.
3. ANTIFRAUD CONCERNS
As noted in Part III, the authors reject the contention that the solu-
tion to the problem of U.S. investor exclusion from cross-border take-
overs is the removal or negation of the U.S. takeover antifraud
provisions. Rather, the proposals put forth in Parts IV.A.1 and IV.A.2
would be undertaken alongside a two-part effort to actively encourage
inclusion through (1) the use of the SEC's rule-making or exemptive
authority to provide potential cross-border takeover participants with a
greater sense of certainty about liability risks under U.S. law, and (2) an
international education effort by the SEC designed to inform non-U.S.
regulators of the adoption of the rule changes proposed herein, and to
encourage them to require the inclusion of U.S. shareholders in order for
bidders to be in compliance with the applicable "equal treatment" rules
in their jurisdictions.
The proposals which follow work from the assumption that sections
11 and 12 of the Securities Act create the greatest degree of uncertainty
236. The SEC already effectively requires that annual reports and registration statements by
equity issuers contain information on required disclosure of interests.
237. However, "doomsday conversions" should not be permitted to trigger this additional
protection for investors. I.e., a target should not be permitted to begin complying with U.S.
reporting requirements as a defensive measure against a non-reporting bidder.
238. See supra note 200.
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regarding U.S. liability. 39 These sections, with their varying "due dili-
gence" and similar defenses, demand that unpracticed participants in the
U.S. capital markets act with the greatest of caution. This is a signifi-
cant handicap in the fast-paced takeover context. This article proposes
that the SEC either take steps to create greater certainty regarding the
scope of section 11 or 12 liability, or that it use its exemptive authority
to create exemptions from sections 11 or 12 liability for those exchange
offer registration statements and prospectuses meeting the requirements
set out in Part IV.A.1 and IV.A.2 above. In either case, traditional lia-
bility for intentional or reckless fraudulent conduct would still exist
under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, providing U.S. investors with ade-
quate protection.24°
The SEC could provide potential bidders with greater certainty
regarding the risk of U.S. liability under sections 11 and 12 of the
Exchange Act in connection with tender and exchange offers by taking
the following steps. First, it could adopt a rule that builds on the MJDS
to establish a presumption that good faith compliance with home-coun-
try disclosure requirements (coupled with compliance with the SEC-
imposed requirements described above) is sufficient to satisfy U.S.
antifraud requirements (including those concerning material omissions).
Second, it should revise Rule 437 under the Securities Act to permit
advisors that are subject to liability (or otherwise made responsible for
disclosure or reports under the applicable home country rules) to be
named in disclosure documents without the filing of a consent (i.e.,
without exposing themselves to section 11 "expert" liability). Third, it
could revise Rule 176 under the Securities Act24' to provide greater gui-
dance and protection for the directors and advisors of an exchange-offer
239. Where the home-country disclosure required in connection with the exchange offer under
is substantially less than that required in connection with an offering or listing in the home
country, then the bidder would be required to comply with the offering or listing disclosure
requirements.
240. Section 11 of the Securities Act creates liability for material misstatements in, or material
omissions from, a registration statement. Such liability may extend to the issuer, directors signing
the registration statement, underwriters and experts consenting to being named in the registration
statement. For the issuer, Section 11 liability is "strict" in that no amount of investigation or "due
care" can shield the issuer from such liability if there is a material misstatement in, or omission
from, the registration statement. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(k)(a) (1994). For most other parties,
however, liability is subject to a defense based on reasonable investigation. See id. § 77(k)(b)
(defense available where party, after reasonable investigation, had reasonable grounds to believe
no such misstatement or omission existed).
Section 12 of the Securities Act creates liability for persons who offer or sell securities by
means of a prospectus or oral communication through use of the jurisdictional means-unless
such person can "sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission." Id. § 77.
241. This would provide investors with the same level of protection as in unregistered offerings
of securities made by way of private placements.
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bidder, including identifying a standard for underwriters and outside
directors that appropriately defines the level of due diligence necessary
to meet the various defenses available under the Securities Act, in the
cross-border offer context.
As noted, an alternative to the proposals set forth in the preceding
paragraph would be for the SEC to use its exemptive authority to create
exemptions from sections 11 and 12 liability for those exchange offer
registration statements meeting the requirements set out in Part IV.A.]
and IV.A.2.
Under either alternative, the anti-fraud provisions of Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act, and Rule lOb-5 thereunder, would continue to pro-
vide investors with adequate protection against securities fraud.
The implementation of either of these alternatives, together with the
adoption of the proposals described in Parts IV.A.] and IV.A.2, should
enable the SEC to approach regulators in other countries (especially
those that have active takeover markets such as the United Kingdom)
and urge them to require bidders to include U.S. persons in order to be in
compliance with the "all-holders" or "equal treatment" requirements of
the particular jurisdiction.
In conjunction with this approach, the SEC should adopt a pre-
sumption that any tender offer for a class of securities of which more
than 5% are U.S. held will have "significant effects" in the United
States, and thus they will be subject to its tender offer rules. This will
also create a strong incentive for non-U.S. bidders to include U.S. hold-
ers, since there will be risks associated with excluding, as well as includ-
ing, U.S. persons.
As previously discussed, there are currently two disincentives for
non-U.S. bidders to include U.S. shareholders in tender and exchange
offers. First, there is the cost and delay of complying with multiple pro-
cedural and disclosure requirements. Second, there is the risk, or per-
ceived risk, of liability under the U.S. anti-fraud provisions. The
preceding proposal fully addresses the first of these disincentives and, it
is hoped, takes sufficient steps to address the second as well. If these or
similar proposals are adopted, the authors believe, exclusion of U.S.
shareholders from cross-border takeovers will be the exception, not the
norm.
B. An Intersystem Proposal
The difficulty of reaching agreement on minimal standards for
takeover regulation has been discussed above in connection with the
proposed Directive 13 in Europe. It would be naive to assume that any
proposal intended to reach that goal (other than one that is the product of
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extensive international scrutiny, comment and review) will find favor in
all, or even many, quarters. However, in light of the broader perspective
on the practices of various countries that the preparation of this Article
has afforded, the authors believe they would be remiss not to at least
make a preliminary proposal, one that hopefully will be picked up by
others, refined and improved upon, and perhaps form the basis of mean-
ingful accord across national boundaries (or at least meaningful
discourse).
The proposal consists of two components. First, a general frame-
work that could be utilized to engender international discussion on the
subject of takeover regulation. To this end, the authors would suggest
that IOSCO establish a working party to study the status of international
takeover regulation and to formulate a set of non-binding recommenda-
tions regarding (1) the nature of supervisory authority, (2) methods for
determining whether the rules of the target's, the bidder's or a third
country should govern a takeover bid, and (3) minimum standards by
which takeovers should be conducted.242 Securities commissions (or in
countries without securities commissions, other relevant government
authorities) would be invited to enter into MOUs with respect to the
recommendations, essentially agreeing to take steps to implement them
(if so empowered) or to use best efforts to influence the legislative pro-
cess to do so.
The second component of the proposal is a brief discussion of some
assumptions on which the authors believe the IOSCO recommendations
should be based. First, that, Where workable, takeover regulation super-
vision is best handled by a voluntary, non-legal body similar to the U.K.
Takeover Panel. Commentators are generally in agreement that the
Panel's speed, coupled with its flexibility and finality, is exceptionally
well-suited to the needs of takeover participants (included affected
shareholders). However, it should be noted that what has worked in the
United Kingdom will not be practicable everywhere, especially where
statutory forms of regulation are already entrenched. Accordingly, the
IOSCO working party may well start with the assumption that non-legal
bodies are the optimal approach, but that different jurisdictions, perhaps
after some experimentation, may or may not find such an approach
suitable.
A second assumption for the IOSCO working party would be that
the rules of the country in which the target is resident should govern the
transaction, and that therefore, the decisions of the regulatory authority
within that country (whether legal or extra-legal) would be binding on
242. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (1996). Rule 176 sets out what constitutes "reasonable
investigation and reasonable grounds for belief' under section 11 of the Securities Act.
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participants. One component of the MOUs entered into by the various
consenting countries would be that deference be paid to the determina-
tions of this "lead" regulatory body under any particular takeover, sub-
ject of course to a public policy exception.
Lastly, the minimal standards for conducting of takeovers would, it
is assumed, be intended to incorporate the spirit of the common goals
discussed at the end of Part III. A discussion of all of the specific
requirements that could or should be considered in pursuit of those goals
is impossible here. However, one area of takeover regulation that has
created controversy in the past, mandatory bids, does bear discussion.
The authors provisionally support the theory that a regulatory sys-
tem should create a full mandatory bid obligation after a certain level of
control has been attained. To do otherwise permits the kind of "creeping
control" that many regulatory systems have realized can marginalize
minority shareholders. This is exemplified by France's recent switch
from a partial mandatory bid rule (requiring a control person to seek at
least 66% of the target's shares after attaining control) to a full
mandatory bid rule. The economic literature on this subject is thus far
inconclusive so it is also expected that the IOSCO working party will
study carefully the empirical evidence provided by participating
countries.
V. CONCLUSION
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions have become a standard fea-
ture of the increasingly global world of international business and
finance. One result of these developments has been that participants in
M&A transactions, including bidders, targets and their respective advis-
ers, are increasingly subject to the disclosure and procedural require-
ments of multiple regulatory systems. Differences between the relevant
regulatory systems means that, without relief in one or more jurisdic-
tions, it may be impossible for a bidder to conduct a single tender or
exchange offer that complies with all applicable rules and regulations.
When a bidder determines that the number of shares that it wants or
needs for its purposes can be attained by focusing its tender activities on
shareholders in a limited number of jurisdictions, shareholders outside
those jurisdictions are frequently excluded from the tender offer. This
problem of shareholder exclusion is especially prevalent in the United
States. This is due to the fact that the U.S. tender offer rules create
procedural and disclosure requirements that are generally more onerous
than those in other developed countries and that the risk of securities
fraud liability is generally viewed as significantly higher in the United
States than in other countries.
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This Article has proposed that the SEC take action to minimize
tension between the U.S. tender offer procedures and exchange-offer
disclosure rules on the one hand, and those of other countries on the
other hand, and that it either provide more concrete guidance on the
level of diligence required of non-U.S. bidders, their directors and finan-
cial advisors in order to establish a defense to liability under the U.S.
securities laws or, alternatively, that it use its exemptive authority to
relieve cross-border exchange offers from antifraud liability under the
Securities Act (but not the Exchange Act's Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-
5). It is the authors' contention that these steps would reduce the cur-
rently strong incentive for excluding U.S. persons from cross border
tender and exchange offers.
This Article has also put forth a preliminary proposal for an inter-
national regulatory response to the difficulty posed by cross-border
acquisitions. The authors hope that these proposals can be the starting
point both for meaningful action by the SEC to ensure greater inclusion
of U.S. persons in tender and exchange offers and for international
accord on takeover regulation and the development of consistent and
reliable set of internationally acknowledged takeover guidelines.
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